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ABSTRACT

The traditional reading o f Hume is that he is a regularity theorist about causation
and a compatibilist on the issue of human freedom and moral responsibility. I argue that
these readings are mutually exclusive—i.e. endorsement of the one entails the rejection of
the other—as they diverge on a fundamental premise, namely, the truth of causal
determinism. Relatively recent “New Hume” scholarship has claimed that he is a causal
realist—i.e. that he believes in the objective (mind-independent) existence of necessary
connections or causal powers. I argue against this “new” reading and offer analysis in
support of one type of the traditional regularity strain.
The main claim I wish to establish is that the misguided compatibilist attribution
derives from the illegitimate bifurcation of Hume’s necessity and liberty arguments on
the part o f commentators on both sides of the dispute, a bifurcation which distorts and
invariably undermines Hume’s ‘reconciling project’. In other words, Hume’s redefinition
of the terms of the free will debate rules out the standard compatibilist reading, as Hume
is not presupposing, or even concerned with, the truth (or falsity) of determinism; rather,
he is concerned with the psychology of our subjective experience (and/or idea) of
necessity, i.e. with how and why necessity (and/or the idea o f necessity) proves essential
to human experience or to human nature. Specifically, I argue that Hume’s treatment of
necessity may be best understood as pointing to pragmatic considerations: his ultimate
concerns are the ways in which our experience(s) of necessity serve(s) us in the way of
prediction, predictability, and/or the ability to predict natural events, including human
actions and choices. This line of thought is especially clear in Section 7 ‘O f Liberty and
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Necessity’ o f An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, while the psycho-subjective
aspect constitutes the focus o f Hume’s discussion of necessary connections in the
Treatise. What is clear from a survey of each o f these texts is that Hume’s treatment of
necessity is not to be confused with a compatibilist’s causal determinist account of the
same.

iv
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Chapter 1: THE DEBATE DEFINED

Locating Hume’s position on the free-will dispute requires a clear understanding
of his conception of the key terms of the debate, such as causal determinism in
contradistinction to notions such as probability and predictability, as well as the main
features o f the compatibilist strategy. While my overall goal is to show that Hume is not
a compatibilist in any traditional sense of the term, although he can and does consider
himself one by redefining the relevant language, it is necessary to begin at a very general
level by showing that since (1) endorsement of (causal) determinism is a central tenet of
compatibilism and (2) Hume is not a determinist, then (3) Hume is by definition not a
compatibilist. I shall then advance my argument by comparing two rival interpretations
of Hume and defending the “Old” as compared to the “New” Hume reading, since it is
this latter camp which claims that Hume is a realist about causation. Next, I shall offer
my own interpretation o f his understanding of necessary connections, concluding by
providing a summary o f my claims and pointing to a need for a more integrated approach
to Hume’s conception o f necessity.

A. Regularity vs. Causal Determinism
A regularity theorist about causation cannot, by definition, also be a compatibilist
because a compatibilist believes in the truth o f determinism—or more precisely, causal
determinism, as I shall shortly argue—while a regularity theorist affirms that causation1
is nothing other than constant conjunction (or regular succession). What is perplexing

11 take the terms ‘causation,’ ‘necessity’, and ‘(causal) determinism’ as synonymous. I agree with J:
Earman’s assessment that causation is, properly speaking, an umbrella term for “whatever goes on when

1
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here is that, with the exception of Paul Russell and George Botterill who, as I shall later
discuss, have both recently argued that a compatibilist needn’t be a determinist2 but only
hold a “regularity” thesis, Old and New Hume3 commentators alike acknowledge the
basis for the distinction between the regularity thesis and causal determinism. Somewhat
less clear, however, is where they stand on the question of determinism. It has been
common practice to confuse or conflate determinism with predictability or probability.
That is to say, while the commentators are resolved that the thesis of determinism is
certainly something other than regularity or succession as maintained by the regularity
theory, they are not so sure in the case of predictability or probability. Much in the way
of attempting to dispel the mistaken conflation between these seemingly related
conceptions appears in the most recent literature. Unfortunately, however, these revisions
appear to be confined to work that is taking place outside of Hume scholarship. It is
evident that any possible confusion lies on the side of determinism as it relates to
predictability and not to regularity.
Accordingly, New Hume scholarship, insofar as it maintains that Hume actually
believes in causal determinism, is internally consistent in attributing a compatibilist
position to Hume. It is not at all clear, however, why or how Old Hume scholars, as
proponents o f the regularity reading, arrive at the same conclusion, i.e. how they are
one event causes another,” when whatever does go on may not, in fact, be an instance o f causal
determinism (John Earman, A prim er on determinism [Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing
Co. 1986], 6). For the sake o f convenience, however, I follow the language o f contemporary Hume
scholarship on the subject. The identification o f Hume’s term ‘necessity’ with our contemporary term
‘determinism’ points to the same source, except that in this case the practice is justified insofar as Hume
conceives o f necessity in terms o f ‘necessary connections’.
2 Unless otherwise specified, I shall henceforth take “determinist” and “determinism” to mean causal
determinist and causal determinism respectively.
3 The term “N ew Hume” was coined by Kenneth P. Winkler in his article The New Hume. “Old Hume”
was subsequently applied to the standard or traditional reading.

2
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seemingly ignorant of holding two incompatible theses: (1) Hume’s conception of
necessity is nothing other than constant conjunction4 and (2) Hume is a compatibilist.
For a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature reveals that even the weakest
articulation o f compatibilism necessarily consists of a more robust version of causality
than that endorsed by the regularity theory, contrary to the positions of both Russell and
Botterill.5 Let me therefore turn to a comparative analysis o f the regularity theory and the
thesis o f causal determinism.

B. Causal Determinism vs. Probability
In “Realism and Causation” Galen Strawson states that while “according to the
basic Regularity theory o f causation, causation is something which does indeed exist in
the world,” causation in turn is in itself “nothing more than regular succession”: for a
regularity theorist, then, “to say that one object-involving event A caused another objectinvolving event B is simply to say that B succeeded A (and was “spatiotemporally
contiguous” to A) and that events of type A are regularly and indeed always succeeded
by (contiguous) events o f type B.”6 He concludes that “according to the regularity view,
then, to say that A caused B is certainly not to say that A produced or gave rise to B .. .let
alone to say that A necessitated B.”7 But this is precisely what an authentic determinist
would contend: that B was causally necessitated by A, i.e. that A implies both (1) that B
could not but have occurred and (2) that B was the only possible outcome. This

4 as well as the accompanying inference o f the mind
5 The very designation ‘compatibilism’ repudiates their views, since the reason for the term is to reconcile
the thesis o f determinism on the one hand with human freedom and moral responsibility on the other.
6 Galen Strawson, “Realism and Causation,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37: 148 (1987): 253.
7 Ibid., 256.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

description of determinism is contained in literature encompassing the earlier to the most
recent articulations. For example, whereas a regularity theorist limits causation to
uniformity and succession in time, a determinist requires a connection between event A
and event B such that (1) in the absence of A, B will not occur and/or (2) the absence of
B presupposes that A was absent. Clearly then, the regularity theory and determinism do
not share a fundamental premise. From this it follows that determinism is also not to be
conflated with such notions as predictability and probability.
Joel Feinberg, in “Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility”, provides the
following eight definitions in response to the question, “What does it mean to say that an
event (a past event E, for instance) is ‘totally determined’?” Those definitions are as
follows: (1) E was completely caused; (2) there were antecedent sufficient conditions for
E: that is, conditions such that given their occurrence E had to occur; (3) it was causally
necessary that E occur; (4) given what preceded it, it was inevitable that E take place; (5)
E is subsumable under a universal law of nature; that is, the occurrence of E was
deducible from a description of the conditions that obtained before its occurrence and
certain universal laws; (6) the occurrence of E is subject to scientific explanation; (7) the
occurrence o f E was in principle predictable; (8) there are circumstances and laws which,
if they had been known, would have made it possible for one to predict the occurrence
o

and exact nature o f E. Feinberg’s catalogue is characteristic of the practice of conflating
the determinist’s thesis with such notions as causation, predictability, and probability.9

8 Feinberg, Joel, 1999. Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility. In Reason & Responsibility: Readings
in Some Basic Problems o f Philosophy, eds. J. Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau. 10th ed. (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company), 410.
9 Interestingly, however, this conflation was common practice in the older literature while Feinberg’s
account is fairly recent.

4
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This confusion emerges most notably in definition 1, and again in definitions 7 and 8, but
also accounts, albeit less clearly, for definition 6.
In his recent article “Arguments for Incompatibilism,” Vihvelin Kadri argues that
“determinism is not a thesis about causation; in particular, it is not the thesis that every
event has a cause.” 10 He goes so far as to remark that “it is now generally accepted that
every event has a cause even though determinism is false and thus some events lack
sufficient or deterministic causes.” Two things are here worth noting. Firstly, Earman’s
claim is borne out: causation ought to be distinguished from determinism, if only because
the statement that every idea has a cause is not equivalent to the statement that every
event has a deterministic cause. Further, and more importantly, is Kadri’s conception of
determinism as consisting o f ‘sufficient’ or ‘deterministic’ causes. In light of the
foregoing, Feinberg’s first definition is clearly false, for it constitutes precisely the sort of
thesis that Kadri is arguing against. In fact, Kadri goes on to state that “what is clear. . .
is that we should not make the assumption almost universally made in the older literature,
that the Every Event has a Cause thesis is equivalent to the thesis of determinism.”11
Kadri explicates his view as follows: “determinism is not a thesis about predictability.
Determinism is a thesis about the kind of laws that govern a world; it says nothing about
whether these laws are knowable by finite beings, let alone whether they could, even in
principle, be used to predict all future events.”12

10 Vihvelin, Kadri, “Arguments for Incompatibilism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (Winter
2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/incompatibilismarguments/ (10 August 2005)
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.

5
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Carl Hoefer presents a similar view in “Causal Determinism”. To Hoefer’s mind,
while predictability is “a fagon de parler that at best makes vivid what is at stake in
determinism, in rigorous discussion it should be eschewed. The world could be highly
predictable, in some senses, and yet not deterministic; and it could be deterministic yet
highly unprobable.”13 As against Feinberg’s description—specifically, definitions 7 and
8—then, determinism ought not to be confused with predictability. However, I wish to
make clear that the question I am concerned with is really not what constitutes an
accurate definition o f determinism as such but rather what Hume understood by it. That
is to say, my argument will collapse only if it can be shown that Hume’s conception of
determinism is consistent with Feinberg’s definitions 1, 7, or 8; but I will argue that in
fact Hume was privy to these very distinctions. At the very least, Newton had published
his determinist particle mechanics (e.g. the Opticks of 1704, especially Query 31) well
before Hume’s work, and he was clearly aware of Newton’s work on the subject14. JeanSimone Laplace (1749-1827) who antedates Hume, is best known for his famous
description of classical particle mechanics:
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its
antecedent state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An
intelligence knowing all the forces acting in nature at a given instant,
as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, would
be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest
bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world . . . to it nothing would be
uncertain, the future as well as the past would be present to its eyes.15
13 Hoefer, Carl, “Causal Determinism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (Summer 2005 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/determinism-causal/ (10 August
2005).
14 There are references to Newton throughout the Treatise.
15 Ernst Nagel, 1961 trans. in Robert C. Bishop, Determinism and Indeterminism, The Stanford
Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, Second Edition (December 2005), http://philsciarchive.pitt.edu/archive/00002324/01/Article.pdf (18 August 2005).

6
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As Bishop points out, Laplace’s intention here is to distinguish probability from certainty.
Now if as early as Laplace these distinctions were being made then it is puzzling why
modern-day commentators have confused and continue to confuse these separate notions.
When it comes to positive descriptions of determinism, the concept of
unavoidability or inevitably—what Kadri identifies as ‘sufficient’ conditions— emerges
as the basic tenet o f the determinist thesis. According to Richard Taylor, determinism is
identified as “the general philosophical thesis which states that for everything that ever
happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen,”16 a
description also found in very recent work on the subject. Michael Mckenna, for
example, defines determinism as “the metaphysical thesis that the facts o f the past, in
conjunction with the laws o f nature, entail every truth about the future . . . [according to
which], if determinism is true, then given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of
nature, only one future is possible at any moment in time.”17 In other words, as I above
articulated, given event A, (1) event B could not but have occurred and (2) event B was
the only possible outcome. It comes to the same thing to say that, given event A, it was
causally necessary for event B to occur, or conversely that event B was causally
necessitated by event A. This characterization is confirmed by Hoefer’s articulation
according to which “the world is governed (or is under the sway of) determinism if and
only if, given a specified way things are at time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as
a matter of natural law.” Likewise, Kadri claims that “we can understand determinism as

16 Richard Taylor, “Determinism,” in The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (London:
Macmillan Publishing Company Inc., 1967), 359.
17

Mckenna, Michael, “Compatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (summer 2004 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/sum 2004/entries/compatibility/ (10 August
2005).
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the thesis that a complete description of the state of the world at any time t and a
complete statement of the laws of nature together entail every truth about what happens at
every time later than t ” Taylor’s 1967 entry in The Encyclopedia o f Philosophy adds still
further support to this line o f reasoning, for according to him “[determinism] is the
general philosophical thesis that for everything that ever happens there are conditions
such that, given them, nothing else could happen.”18 Thus understood, Feinberg’s
description of determinism is, properly speaking, confined to definitions 2 through 5—
namely: (i) causal necessitation and (ii) sufficiency of conditions, either or both of which
constitute causal determinism. What is clear from the foregoing, then, is that the
regularity theory of causation and determinism as above defined are mutually exclusive
theses. However, it must also be shown that compatibilism necessarily presupposes not
regularity but specifically the truth of determinism understood in this way. It is to this
project that I shall now turn.

C. Compatibilism
The historical origins of the free will debate can be traced back to largely
theological concerns19, specifically to the attempt to account for how, given an

18 Taylor, op. cit., 359.
19 As Timothy O ’Connor explains, “A large portion o f Western philosophical writing on free will was and
is written within an overarching theological framework, according to which God is the ultimate source and
sustainer o f all else. Some o f these thinkers draw the conclusion that God must be a sufficient, wholly
determining cause for everything that happens; all suppose that every creaturely act necessarily depends on
the explanatorily prior, cooperative activity o f God. It is also presumed that human beings are free and
responsible (on pain o f attributing evil in the world to God alone, and so impugning His perfect goodness).
Hence, those who believe that God is omni-determining typically are compatibilists with respect to freedom
and (in this case) theological determinism. . . . But those who suppose that God’s sustaining activity (and
special activity o f conferring grace) is only a necessary condition on the outcome o f human free choices
need to tell a more subtle story, on which omnipotent God’s cooperative activity can be (explanatorily)
prior to a human choice and yet the outcome o f that choice be settled only by the choice itself.” O ’Connor,
Timothy, “Free W ill,” The Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (summer 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta
(ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/ (07 January 2006). The non-theological foundations o f the

8
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omnibenevolent,20 omnipotent, and omniscient God who determines all natural events
(including human actions and choices), human beings can be said to be free and
consequently held accountable for their actions. In the attempt to resolve this problem,
however, the theory o f determinism turns into a dilemma.21 Against the determinist
thesis, the theory o f indeterminism—i.e. the thesis that some, but not all, events are
•

determined—emerges as its “logical contradictory” as Feinberg explicates.

99

The

dilemma derives from the fact that, irrespective of whether one accepts determinism or
indeterminism, the problem is the same: namely, our inability to be held responsible for
our actions (choices).23 That is, if determinism is true, then everything is determined, and
consequently we cannot be held morally responsible even if we are causally responsible;
and if determinism is false (from which it follows that indeterminism is true), then we
also cannot be held responsible since our actions are not determined but random or the

debate originate in the works o f Epicurus (among others). Epicurus’ atomism provides a purely materialist
conception o f the free will issue (i.e. the swerve o f the atom).
20 Note that benevolence implies justice which leads to the ‘problem o f evil’ controversy.
21 Dennett, however, has recently disputed this specific conception o f determinism and more generally o f
the free-will debate, basing his claims on the evolutionary nature o f the human species. He argues, for
example, that “determinism is the thesis that ‘there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future’
(Van Inwagen 1983, p.3). This is not a particularly difficult idea, one would think, but it’s amazing how
often even very thoughtful writers get it wrong. First, many thinkers assume that determinism implies
inevitability. It doesn’t. Second, many think it is obvious that indeterminism—the denial o f determinism—
would give us agents some freedom, some maneuvaribility, some elbow room, that we just couldn’t have in
a deterministic universe. It wouldn’t. Third, it is commonly supposed that in a deterministic world, there
are no real options, only apparent options. This is false. Really? I have just contradicted three themes so
central to discussions o f free will, and so seldom challenged, that many readers must suppose I am kidding,
or using these words in some esoteric sense. No, I am claiming that the complacency with which these
theses are commonly granted without argument is a large mistake.” From Freedom Evolves, p. 25. See
also chapter 2.
22 Feinberg, op. cit., 410.
23 Or alternatively, the problem o f justice. The contemporary free will debate is most prominent in moral
and legal philosophy, where theological interests have, for the most part, been supplanted by concerns to
provide a theoretical framework for accounting for our attributions o f praise and blame, in the context o f
morality and ethics, and reward and punishment in the context o f our laws.

9
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product of chance, and hence even the attribution of genuine causal responsibility will be
mistaken.
Traditionally, commentators have attempted to resolve the dilemma utilizing one
of three strategies. Hard determinists hold both that determinism is true and that it is not
compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Libertarians,24 on the other hand, hold
that determinism is incompatible with human freedom and moral responsibility but deny
that determinism is true. Finally, as against either of the preceding lines of thought,
compatibilists (also known as soft determinists) hold both that determinism is true and
that it is compatible with free will and moral responsibility.25 Thus understood, the free
will debate hinges on the acceptance or denial of the truth of determinism.
Taylor’s summary of William James’ thoughts on the issue supports this view.
According to Taylor, James’ rejection of the determinist thesis (and hence, his adoption
of indeterminism) derives from the judgement that determinism “implies that the world
we have is the only possible world and that nothing could have been other than it was.”
The problem as James sees it, Taylor continues, is that such a worldview is “incompatible
with the reasonableness o f regret and other basic moral sentiments.” Accordingly, “in the
course of his argument he drew a very useful distinction between what he called ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ determinism. By soft determinism he meant all those theories . . . which affirm
that determinism is true.”

7 ft

If so, then we may say that what distinguishes a hard

24 Libertarians are, by definition, indeterminists. They hold that human actions are not determined in the
same way that other natural events are but caused by the agent’s own reasons.
25 See Feinberg, pp. 411-415, for a detailed account o f the foregoing.
26 The quote in its entirety, reads: “By soft determinism he meant all those theories, like those o f Hobbes,
Hume and Mill, which affirm that determinism is true.” Taylor, R. “Determinism” p. 368. I obviously do
not agree with the full content o f Taylor’s claim.

10
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determinist from a soft determinist is just the difference in their operative notions of
liberty: hard determinists conceive of liberty in a categorical sense while compatibilists
construe liberty in a hypothetical sense. Here is how Feinberg explains this distinction:
“In the categorical sense, to say that an act is avoidable is to say that there were no
antecedent conditions (causes) sufficient for its occurrence. In the hypothetical sense, to
say that an act is avoidable is to say that i f the actor had chosen (or, perhaps, intended) to
do otherwise, he would have done otherwise (nothing would have stopped him).”27
It is my claim that the reason commentators have, not completely unreasonably,
mistakenly designated Hume a compatibilist is that he construes freedom in the above
hypothetical sense in the Inquiry.

9Q

It is Russell’s and Botterill’s failure to appreciate the

context of Hume’s ‘reconciling project’ which is most frustrating for an accurate
understanding o f what Hume is most precisely attempting to reconcile, for they simply
appear ignorant o f that context. In saying this I am not equating Hume’s terminology
with what would be understood as standard compatibilism but simply making the point
that Hume, like all participants in the debate, is privy to the terms of the argument, the
most important o f which clearly being the operative definition o f determinism then
generally acknowledged. In other words, I am claiming that Hume’s solution to the
problem is to reconcile the dilemma, not according to the traditional compatibilist
position, but rather by redefining or reformulating the problem in its entirety. Hume’s
reference to a need for a reconciliation reveals only that he is at least cognizant of the
terms o f the debate; this in turn merely reveals how the dilemma would resolve itself if
27 Feinberg, J. “Determinism, Free Will and Responsibility,” 414.
281 shall return to this point in chapter four.
29 This definition appears in unelaborated form in the Treatise-, see chapter 4 below.

11
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only we would agree to redefine the issue altogether and by so doing, to eliminate it
entirely. Designating Hume a compatibilist is thus certainly possible, but only on the
understanding that it not be confused for the standard sense o f “compatibilism.”
Given the dearth of literature devoted specifically to Hume’s position on the free
will debate,30 it is unfortunate that Russell and Botterill, the two scholars who actually
•3 1

treat his discussion o f liberty and necessity, prove so inadequate in their analyses.

It is

relevant to note, however, that both of these commentators are, ironically enough,
arguing against the classical compatibilist construal of Hume. Instead of denying that he
is a compatibilist, however, they endorse a more subtle reading. This ‘revisionist’
interpretation appears in its most emphatic form in Russell’s book Freedom and Moral
Sentiment,32 where he argues that the traditional construal derives from the illegitimate
practice o f treating Hume’s liberty and necessity arguments independently of the other.
The most significant aspect of Russell’s critique of the classical compatibilist reading is
that it is founded on a false premise, namely that, according to the traditional
interpretation, “Hume’s regularity theory of causation serves to strengthen the (classical)
compatibilist position and frees it of difficulties which metaphysical (i.e. nonregularity)
conceptions o f causation would otherwise present for it.”33 Clearly, Russell fails to

30 Most Hume literature consists in analyses o f his treatment o f ethics, causation and, most recently,
aesthetics.
31 Perhaps even more unfortunate is the fact that these very works are regarded as highly laudable
treatments o f the topic. Peter Millican, for instance, in his “Critical Survey o f the Literature”, notes that,
“The recent recognition that Hume’s compatibilism is more distinctive and subtle than previously assumed,
and rooted at least as much in his naturalist project as in conceptual concerns, is due largely to Russell’s
work, brought together in what is undoubtedly the most important book on the topic . . . ” (447).

MISSING FROM BIBLIO
32 Paul Russell, Freedom and moral sentiment: Hume’s way o f naturalizing responsibility (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995).
33 Ibid., 44.
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appreciate that the raison d ’etre of the free will debate is the issue of the truth or falsity
of determinism for all parties involved, i.e. hard determinists, indeterminists, and
compatibilists. To allege, therefore, that Hume’s regularity theory is regarded by
compatibilists following in the classical vein as strengthening their case appears, at best,
counterintuitive.
Most perplexing about Russell’s analysis is his apparent failure to appreciate that
in redefining the terms of the debate his argument falls outside the traditional free will
framework. Claiming that most classical compatibilist construals err in emphasizing
Hume’s liberty arguments to the negligence of his conception of necessity, Russell sets
out to show how Hume’s treatment of necessity—i.e. his regularity theory—is essential
to an accurate interpretation o f Hume’s position. This is precisely what I am claiming; so
far so good. The problem, however, is that Russell claims that Hume’s regularity theory
does not rule out the possibility for a compatibilist thesis, but rather supports it. Much of
what Russell provides in the way of analysis of the debate illuminates this failure on his
part. These oversights occur throughout. There are simply too many to record here, so I
have limited myself to the most notable examples. Against the compatibilist’s
hypothetical sense o f liberty, Russell writes that incompatibilists argue that “the issue
which ought to concern us in this context is not so much whether or not we could have
acted otherwise if we had chosen to do so but whether or not we could have chosen
otherwise given the circumstances. If our choices and willings are themselves
determined by antecedent natural causes, then we could never choose otherwise than we
actually do. Given the actual circumstances, it seems evident that we (always) have to
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act as we do.”34 Here Russell is contrasting the compatibilist’s hypothetical conception of
liberty with the (hard) determinist’s categorical sense which, as above explicated,
constitutes the basis of the free will dispute. Clearly, participants to the debate share the
fundamental assumption that the question of human freedom and responsibility consists
in two issues, namely whether or not these are in fact compatible with determinism, on
one hand, and, on the other, whether or not determinism is actually the case. In other
words, the debate is limited to consideration of whether or not a person can be said to be
free, in spite of, or, despite, the truth of determinism. This is what accounts for the
incompatibilist’s claim that the question ought not to turn on whether or not “we could
have acted otherwise if we had so chosen,” but whether in fact we could have so chosen
in the first place. The incompatibilist’s position consists in a denial of any such choice
“given the circumstances” or the “antecedent natural causes”. The strategy is, therefore,
to oppose freedom to coercion rather than to determinism, not to redefine necessity in
terms of a regularity thesis, as Russell claims Hume (and his successors) does (do).
To be sure, Hume does redefine necessity in terms o f regularity, but this is
precisely why he is not a compatibilist as defined by the terms of the established debate.
Put another way, there would be nothing to debate if participants were not agreed on the
point at issue. This is also why the classical interpretation has focused on Hume’s liberty
arguments while ignoring his treatment of necessity. It is precisely because
commentators appreciate that a regularity thesis is not compatible with their construal
that they limit their analyses to Hume’s identification of freedom as ‘he could have done
otherwise’. Here, at least, they have something to work with—in effect, a definition from

34 Ibid., 14; emphases in original.
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Hume that, when taken out o f its intended context, can be construed as supporting a
compatibilist line of reasoning.
Botterill’s analysis fares no better, suffering from an internal inconsistency that
appears to originate in irresolution of the meanings of the terms o f the debate. Most
notable is Botterill’s vacillation on the definition o f causal determinism. At first
glance—as against Russell—he appears to acknowledge the centrality o f the role
assumed by the doctrine o f determinism. He claims that the free will debate hinges on
the question, “If our actions are causally determined, can we still maintain that we are
capable o f acting freely?”

In fact, he goes so far as to identify the free will debate as
- j/r

“the topic of Moral Responsibility and Causal Determinism.”

My reason for

emphasizing the designation ‘causal’ is simple enough: Botterill’s use of the term does
not leave any room for speculation as to the sort of deterministic thesis he has in mind.
That is to say, it is clear that Botterill’s definition is that of determinism proper.37 Unless
Botterill is unclear as to what ‘causal’ means—causal necessity or sufficiency of
conditions—then he clearly understands by causal determinism what everyone else does,
namely that: (1) the cause necessarily produces the effect, or conversely, the effect is
necessarily produced by the cause, and (2) that the effect produced was the only possible
one (given the cause). Clearly then, it cannot be countered that Botterill is equating the
term with prediction (or probability), regular succession, etc., as above explicated.

35 George Botterill, “Hume on Liberty and Necessity,” in Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays
on the First Enquiry, ed. Peter Millican (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 277; my emphases.
36 Ibid.; my emphasis.
37 That is, definitions 2-5 in Feinberg, as I earlier delineated.
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Having defined the key issue, Botterill proceeds by all appearances to contradict
himself. In reference to Hume’s necessity argument,

for instance, he writes that it

“cannot be described as having made a lasting contribution to the development of
compatibilism, if only because a modem compatibilist need not be, as Hume was, a
convinced determinist. Modem science has certainly not delivered the unequivocal
verdict in favour o f determinism that appeared to be indicated by Newtonian mechanics.”
All is not lost, however, since this “does not rob compatibilism of its philosophical
interest.”39 A significant detail emerges from this claim: either Botterill is contradicting
his original position or he is equivocating. Let us consider each in order.
Botterill would be contradicting himself if, after having recognized the free will
debate as originating in the question of the compatibility of moral responsibility and
determinism, he is now alleging that determinism is neither important to nor necessary
for the compatibilist’s thesis. This ambiguity is exacerbated by his claim that Hume was
a convinced determinist; elsewhere, however, he makes it clear that Hume conceives of
necessity as consisting in constant conjunction or the inference of the mind.40 But the
regularity reading is undermined by the association with Newton’s famously
deterministic mechanics,41 and so one is left wondering precisely what Botterill is here

38 That is, his treatment o f causation. Precisely what description o f it Botterill here intends—basic
regularity theory or determinism—is unclear. Like Russell, Botterill seems satisfied to conflate the two. In
his case, however, this makes him the more inconsistent o f the two because, unlike Russell, he adds the
‘causal’ descriptor.
39 Botterill, op. cit., 282.
40 Ibid., 290.
41 Recently, doubts have been raised as to whether, in fact, Newton’s determinism is as deterministic as it
has traditionally been purported as being. This is an issue that deserves an investigation all its own. For my
purposes, I am simply going to take it for granted that the standard interpretation is accurate.
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intending in reference to Hume’s “determinism”. A little further on, however, a possible
solution is provided, where he argues that Hume can and does accept determinism as an
ontological or metaphysical thesis, at the level of observation—i.e. of natural events,
human actions—nothing can be discerned beyond constant conjunction.42 While this line
of argument is not properly speaking internally inconsistent, it is inconsistent with the
dispute more generally, and more specifically with the compatibilist position. For
Botterill’s point is that, quite apart from Hume’s particular conception of necessity,
ultimately determinism is unimportant to the free will debate and the compatibilist
position. In saying this, Botterill is either contradicting himself or misrepresenting the
issue, and thus his argument proves as flawed as Russell’s.
In one respect, however, insofar as Russell at least appreciates the central
importance o f Hume’s necessity argument for his particular brand of compatibilism, his
analysis proves the better o f the two. And, in fact, I agree with Russell’s assessment, but
because I disagree with him on a fundamental premise—i.e. that the regularity theory is
reconcilable with a compatibilist position—I am led to an opposing conclusion, namely
that Hume for precisely this reason cannot be a compatibilist. I also agree with Russell
that the (traditional) compatibilist reading finds its source in Hume’s liberty arguments,
specifically, his liberty o f spontaneity (or hypothetical sense of freedom) understood as
the absence o f coercion or constraint. But whereas Russell is perplexed as to the cause of
this spotlight, this perplexity vanishes given the analysis provided above.
Why did Hume commentators overlook this obvious solution to the problem
discussed above? While I can only speculate, clearly, it seems to me that Hume
scholarship, as illustrated by the arguments of both Russell and Botterill (among others),
42 This is a line that is defended by many New Hume commentators as I shall discuss in Chapter 3.
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is fundamentally uninformed about the philosophical technicalities those participants
directly involved in the free will debate at the time mutually recognized. But why they
are seemingly undisturbed by this failure on their part is not part of my present task, since
my concern is not to provide possible explanations as to why Hume scholarship simply
takes Hume’s compatibilism for granted but rather to show why and how this assumption
is mistaken. In order to show this, however, I need to first establish that Hume holds a
regularity theory o f causation. It is this proposition which is the central focus of the next
chapter.
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Chapter 2: THE ‘OLD HUME’

The standard (“Old Hume”) reading is that Hume is a regularity theorist about
causation. That is to say, that he believes that necessity is nothing other than (1) the
constant conjunction o f like objects and (2) the inference of the mind from one object to
another. In effect, traditional commentators maintain that Hume is not a causal realist; he
does not believe in the objective or mind-independent existence of necessary
connections.43 This appears a natural enough interpretation, except for the fact that
Hume’s treatment o f necessity is closely linked to his discussions of necessary
connections. Consequently, Old Humeans find themselves wanting to deny that Hume
believes in the actual existence of necessary connections while, however, appreciating
that doing so entails providing an alternate account for his seeming concession to causal
powers (or necessary connections).
According to Janet Broughton, regularity readings can be best organized under
either (distinct but related) projectivist44 or psychological interpretations. While I agree
with Broughton’s division, I think it is also important to note the central premises held in
common by these strains that ultimately serve to unite and distinguish the regularity
account from its rival causal realist construal. For speaking generally, Old Hume
commentary can be identified by way of several key themes, namely (1) rejection of
43 Interpreting Hume as agnostic on the issue o f the objective existence o f causal powers is another
possibility, and one that I shall examine in greater detail in chapter 4. It is important to note, however, that
the agnostic reading is independent o f each o f the standard regularity construals, as well as the New Hume
strain.
44 Broughton identifies the projectivist strand as the “epistemological view”. I think, however, that that
designation is too broad; the psychological view is, in that respect, an epistemological view, specifically
one about the limits o f our knowledge o f necessary connections. For this reason, I think the term
‘projectivist’ is more suitable. Janet Broughton, “Hume’s ideas about necessary connections,” Hume
Studies 13 (November 1987): 224.
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Hume’s references to ‘powers,’ ‘force,’ ‘energy,’ etc. as pointing to the objective
existence of necessary connections; (2) acceptance of Hume’s theory o f ideas as
precluding the possibility of distinguishing between (our) conceptions and (our) beliefs;
and most notably (3) acceptance of Humean skepticism’s compatibility with the
affirmative denial of causal powers. Stroud and Stanford’s analyses certainly bear out
this characterization, whether implicitly or explicitly so.
Broughton identifies the first strain as being explicitly endorsed in Stroud’s
projectivist account,45 according to which Hume does not deny our having the idea of
necessity but rejects the view that we are justified in applying it to anything, including
natural events: “The mind,” according to Broughton, “has a propensity to project its
impressions onto things” but “we are unjustified in attributing this feature to objects.”46
This in turn follows from Hume’s theory of ideas, according to which all our ideas are
derived from impressions. Since, however, we cannot observe necessity—in the external
objects of the material world—because we have no impression(s) of it, we are unjustified
in our attributions of necessary connections to the events and objects of the world.
Whereas the projectivist view hinges on justifiability, the psychological reading
on the other hand centres on the meaningfulness of the idea o f necessity. These views are
clearly not unrelated, for the psychological account accepts the second premise of its rival
strain—i.e. that we are unjustified in applying our idea o f necessity to external objects—
by denying, however, its first premise, namely that we in fact do have a meaningful
(intelligible, coherent) idea o f necessity in the first place. As Broughton puts it,

45 “Although there are hints o f this kind o f interpretation in other books, it is really articulated and defended
only in Barry Stroud’s book, Hume." Broughton, op. cit., 219.
46 Ibid., 220.
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psychological readings can be summed up as claiming that, “in talking about necessary
connections, we succeed only in talking about our own feelings.”47 Note that “feelings”
should be here understood as the internal impressions and/or determinations

of thought

which accompany the experience of the repeated constant conjunction of like objects.
When she adds that “people just aren’t talking about their feelings when they talk about
necessary connections,”49 clearly she is not referring to emotions but is rather making the
point that our internal impressions or determination(s) of thought refer to an external
source. By comparison, the psychological interpretation constitutes the stricter of the two
regularity strains insofar as it is unwilling to allow for the mere possibility of an external
referent as the cause o f the idea of necessity in us. This, in effect, accounts for the basis
of the distinction between the competing interpretations. Whereas readings informed by
the psychological line of interpretation deny the very intelligibility of the idea of
necessity and hence of the notion of necessary connections altogether, the projectivist
view does not claim that the idea is itself incoherent because in order to project—albeit
falsely—the idea o f necessity onto external objects we must in the first place possess an
idea of it. As Stanford remarks, the operation of the projective mechanism presupposes
that “we need at least an idea of necessity as something true of the connections between
events.”50 In what follows I will present and discuss in greater detail these two strains of
the regularity reading. I will begin by considering Stroud’s projection argument and then
proceed to a treatment o f Stanford’s psychological account.
47 Broughton, op. cit., 224.
48 By ‘determination’ I here mean anticipation, expectation, e tc ., not to be confused with ‘(causal)
determination’.
49 Ibid., 225.
50 Stroud, Hume, 83 quoted in P. Kyle Stanford, 2; emphasis in original.
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A. The ‘Projectivist’ Strain
As Broughton indicates, the main source of Stroud’s projectivist model is
presented in his book Hume. The basic thrust of his argument there is, however, also
presented in a more recent article, “Hume on ‘Gilding or staining’ the world with
‘sentiments’ and ‘phantasms’,” 51 upon which I shall base my discussion. Stroud reasons
that, while Hume’s theory o f ideas, together with his particular worldview, precludes the
possibility o f discovering necessity in the objects of the world, he does believe that we do
in fact attribute, albeit falsely, necessary connections to the relations between the events
and objects of the world.52 He further claims that Hume’s discussion of secondary
qualities—a carry-over from the early modem period — is applicable to his treatment of
causation. That is to say, just as beauty or ugliness, etc., are not, properly speaking,
actual qualities of objects, and vice or virtue, etc., are not qualities of actions, but rather
‘additions’ by us, so too “something ‘new’ is produced in the case of causation, and never
by reason or the understanding.” The source of this addition is, for Hume, “the
imagination which in all these cases exhibits ‘a productive faculty.. . [which,] gilding or
staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a
manner a new creation.’ (E294)”54 He explains as follows: “What is involved in the
mind’s ‘spreading’ itself on to external objects and ‘conjoining’ with them, or
‘transferring’ to them, something ‘borrowed’ from internal impressions or sentiments . . .
51 Barry Stroud, “Hume on ‘Gilding or staining’ the world with ‘sentiments’ and ‘phantasms’,” in The new
Hume debate, eds. Rupert Read and Kenneth A. Richman (New York: Routledge, 2000).
52 While Broughton is correct in attributing the projectivist argument to Stroud, since the publication o f her
article, other projectivist readings have emerged— e.g. S. Blackburn, D. Pears.
53 As Stroud rightly explains, this is a theory inherited from Locke and Berkeley— i.e. all objects are really
qualities o f our senses.
54 Stroud, “Gilding,” 21.
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[is the] mental operation o f projection.”55 It is this mechanism which Stroud claims
Hume argues for in passages from both the Treatise and the Inquiry. Hence, Stroud’s
claim that “in the first Enquiry he describes that same ‘spreading’ or ‘conjoining’
operation this way: ‘as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas, we transfer that
feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every
internal sensation, which they occasion’ (E78n).”56 The Treatise passage indicated by
Stroud is this: “We ‘feel a determination of the mind’ to ‘pass from one object to the idea
of its usual attendant’ (T165).” On these textual grounds Stroud alleges that “it is that
impression, or what it is an impression of, that we somehow ‘spread’ on or ‘transfer’ to or
‘conjoin’ with the objects now before us, and so come to ‘imagine’ or ‘suppose’ that they
are causally or necessarily connected.”

cn

The direct source for Stroud’s projection model comes from the following
passage in the Treatise:
’Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on
external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impressions, which they occasion, and
which always make their appearance at the same time that these objects discover themselves to the
senses. Thus as certain sounds and smells are always found to attend certain visible objects, we
naturally imagine a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and the qualities, tho’ the
qualities be o f such a nature to admit o f no such conjunction, and really exist no where.. .the same
propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider,
not in our mind, that considers them. 8

Thus understood, Stroud argues that “in each case, the mind ‘transfers’ features of
its internal workings or contents to an external world that does not really contain

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid., 20.
57 Ibid, 20-21.
58 David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, 2nd ed., L.A. Selby and P.H. Nidditch, eds.
(Oxford:Clarendon Press, [1888] 1978).
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them.”59 This perceived discrepancy between the internal and external, or subjective
and objective, respectively, is key to his interpretation, an interpretation which
leaves Hume with the problem of accounting for how this mechanism operates given
“[his] view o f the world or of ‘nature’ according to which no such qualities or
relations could belong to or hold between the objects that make up that world.”60
Stroud’s point is that it is precisely because Hume maintains that we cannot discover
necessity in the external world61 that this projecting mechanism operates by
“‘adding’ something to our conception of the world, by ‘gilding’ or ‘staining’ it with
something that does not really belong to it.”
Central to Stroud’s projectivist thesis is the intentional aspect of this
projective mechanism. Clearly, he is mindful not to construe Hume’s theory of
ideas along idealistic lines.63 Accordingly, he takes Hume as assuming that we do
not simply project the feelings (that happen to accompany our observations), but
rather “what the impression is an impression o/that we so predicate.”64 That is to
say, the inherited ‘modem philosophy’ view, according to which “the redness we see
is nothing more than a feature of our impressions,”65 would leave Hume unable to
account for what impressions are actually impressions of, and hence render his

59 Stroud, ibid.
60 Ibid., 21-22.
61 More specifically, between the relations o f events and objects in the material world.
62 Ibid., 22.
63 For example, the Berkeleyan variety wherein objects are held to be “nothing more than a collection or
combination o f sensible qualities.” Ibid., 28.
64 Ibid, 22; emphasis in original.
65 Ibid.
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theory of ideas (as well as his philosophy in general) an idealistic doctrine about our
subjective impressions rather than what we quite obviously ‘gild’ or ‘spread’ on to
objects in the case o f the moral sentiments and causation. And this is why Stroud
wants to say that, “at least some impressions66 must be understood ‘intentionally’, as
being ‘o f something that could be so, or of something that could be thought to be
true of external objects.”67
But herein lay Hume’s problem and the basis for Stroud’s reading.
Recalling that for Hume, an idea is necessarily derived from an impression, but that
in the case o f necessity no such impression actually exists, it becomes at once clear
that “if we must possess the idea of necessary connection in order to ‘feel’ that two
things are connected, even in the mind, then it would seem that we could have such
a ‘feeling’ only if we had already performed the operation o f ‘gilding or staining’.
Hume thinks that that operation is the only way we come to think of two things as
z ro

causally connected in the first place.”

That is, unlike the feeling of pain, for

instance, which is not localizable and which could not be said to be an actual quality
of any existing external object, the ‘felt’ necessary connection between two external
objects must have an external referent. Put another way, the feeling in us of
necessity—the internal impression, or ‘determination o f thought’ that accompanies
the experience o f observing the constant conjunction of objects— must, in order to

66 For example, that o f necessity.
67 Ibid., 25.
68 Ibid., 26.
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arise in the first place, refer to something beyond the content(s) o f our mind:
external objects.
But a dilemma here emerges. For on the one hand, it is clear that the idea
of necessity is the product of the projective mechanism (rather than its cause), while
on the other hand Hume’s theory of ideas, together with his particular notion of the
mind, seemingly leads him into a contradiction, namely that the idea of necessity
cannot refer to external objects in the world and simultaneously must do so. As
Stroud explains, “The ‘gilding or staining’ operation . . . must start from a feeling or
impression which is ‘o f something, or has an object, in the ‘intentional’ sense; but it
cannot be ‘o f any object or quality or relation which could be part of the way things
‘really stand in nature’. If it were, no ‘gilding or staining’ would be necessary.”69 In
other words, for Hume, ‘gilding or staining’ is a necessary condition for our idea of
necessity (among others). This idea cannot, in turn, simply refer to the content(s) of
our mind but must have an external referent. At the same time, the very detail that
the idea is a product of the projective mechanism (i.e. rather than of a sense-based
impression) presupposes that necessity70 as such is not a quality of external objects
as they are in themselves. For Stroud there is thus no question as to Hume’s belief
in the intelligibility o f the idea o f necessity. That we project ‘necessity’ onto the
relations between objects entails that we can make sense of the idea. Rather, the
issue for Stroud is how, given Hume’s inherited theory of ideas and his “special

69 Ibid, 27.
70 And likewise, necessary connections.
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conception of the mind and its content,” we can ‘spread’ the content(s) of our mind
on to external objects when the nature of these very objects is indiscoverable by us.
Consequently, Stroud acknowledges that the belief of necessity arising from this
projection on our part is false for just this reason.
tension in Hume’s line o f reasoning,

He acknowledges this general

articulating it in terms of a general failure to

account for the precise mechanism and/or process by which our impressions can be
said to relate to and generate their accompanying ideas. He does nonetheless
maintain that Hume considers it to be the source of our idea o f necessity, albeit a
false one, since as a regularity theorist, Hume does not actually believe in the
objective existence of necessary connections.74
The strength of Stroud’s projectivist thesis (and projection readings in
general) is also its weakness. That is to say, while his reading represents an attempt
to reconcile two seemingly incompatible strains of thought in Hume, it fails for this
very reason. This, in turn, is a result of its failure to appreciate that the tension
inherent in Hume’s account o f necessity as it relates to our impressions and ideas, on
the one hand, and as it pertains to the actual qualities of the external objects of the
world, on the other, arises not from Hume’s general philosophy but from his
particular interpretation o f it. This line of criticism is most explicitly articulated by
Broughton and, most recently, by Stanford. In short, the main contention o f each of

71 Ibid.
72 To this end, Stanford’s identification o f Stroud’s reading as the “false projectivist” account is highly
appropriate.
73 Specifically, Stroud claims that it derives from an absence o f an account o f judgement.
74 Nor in any o f the related terms: causal powers, force, energy, etc.
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these commentator’s objections originates in the claim that Hume denies that we can
project (necessity onto things).75 Much of their criticism draws on the same lines of
thought and counts the same passages as part of the textual evidence that
undermines Stroud’s case. Citing the famous passage quoted at length above, which
constitutes the basis for the ‘spreading’ mechanism, both Broughton and Stanford76
argue that the main source o f Stroud’s evidence—the assumption that Hume’s
treatment of secondary qualities is directly applicable to his construal of causation—
is false. They each point out that sounds and smells are unlike necessity, “of such a
nature as to admit o f no such conjunction.” As Stanford explains, “it does not
simply happen to be the case that there are no such qualities in objects, but that the
nature of these qualities themselves somehow precludes them from being in
things.”77 Presumably, Stanford thus infers from this that Hume is in effect denying
that a projective mechanism is even operative in the case of these particular
qualities. Additionally, picking up on a point neglected by Broughton, Stanford
makes the insightful observation that “the most natural example of such
projection,”78 that o f colour, is conspicuously missing from the projection passage.
For her part, as a counter to the role alleged by Stroud to be assumed by the

75 It is worth noting that their starting premises are, however, opposed. That is to say, Broughton reads
Hume as a causal realist while Stanford construes him as a regularity theorist. Clearly, their objections
point to opposing motivations. Broughton’s criticism o f the projectivist model, for instance, can be best
understood as being incidental to her main target, namely, the regularity reading that undergirds it.
Stanford’s critique, on the other hand, clearly does not dispute that feature o f the interpretation, but in fact
originates in the b elief that the very possibility o f projecting gives too much away to the realist camp since
it presupposes an external referent (beyond the content(s) o f our mind).
76 Stanford, P. Kyle, “The Manifest Connection,” Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 40 (2002): 339-360.
77 Ibid., 353.
78 Ibid.

28

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

imagination in the projective process,79 Broughton cites a number of passages80
wherein Hume is clearly denying it any such role.

01

Broughton claims that Hume

denies that we can ‘spread’ the feeling of determination onto objects precisely
because this ‘feeling’ cannot be a feature of objects. Accordingly, she reasons that
Hume’s point is not that we are merely unjustified in making legitimate claims about
necessary connections but that we are ultimately doomed to “empty talk or
contradiction” whenever we try to “fill in the bare thought o f a something-or-other
in the object.”

But Stanford, I think, provides the most emphatic objection to this

line of reasoning, arguing that “Hume’s discussion in ‘O f the Immateriality of the
Soul’ makes clear that the famous projection passage is not claiming that we
attribute necessity to objects just as we attribute secondary qualities in general to
them. Instead, Hume is analogizing the projection of necessity to the objects to the
‘absurd,’ ‘unintelligible,’ and ‘contradictory’ projection of specifically non-visual
and non-tactile secondary qualities to them.”83
If Broughton and Stanford’s analyses are accurate, then Stroud’s reading would
appear to stand or fall on whether or not Hume allows for our being able to project to
begin with. I am inclined to agree with both commentators that the textual evidence

79 For example, “It is the imagination which in all these cases exhibits: ‘a productive faculty, and gilding or
staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new
creation’ (E294).” Stroud, “Gilding”, 21.
80 For example, T235-236; T238; T239, in Broughton, op. cit., 222.
81 Stanford additionally extends the (secondary qualities) analogy to Hume’s discussion of, “non-visual,
non-tactile secondary qualities.” Stanford, op. cit. Broughton, for her part, alludes to in passing, but does
not discuss, these same qualities.
82 Stanford concludes much the same: “the very attempt to project necessity onto the world in the first place
is incoherent and therefore doomed to failure.” Stanford, op cit., 354; emphasis in original.
83 Ibid.
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points against this possibility. However, the question then arises as to what Hume could
possibly have in mind in passages where he appears to be describing just such a
mechanism. I can certainly appreciate the source of Stanford’s opposition insofar as the
implications entailed by our simply being able to form even the mere idea o f necessity
prove inimical to a consistent regularity reading. Stroud (as does every projectivist
account) faces the dilemma of establishing how, given that we can conceive of the idea of
necessity, where necessity is understood as an actual (intrinsic) property o f the relations
between objects, proves to be an ontological impossibility. This problematic is certainly
lent credence by the existence of agnostic strands of the projectivist reading84 which
remain neutral on the causal realist question. Presumably proponents of this latter
agnostic strain are, by definition, not endorsing a regularity account.
There is, however, perhaps a way of salvaging Stroud’s analysis from Stanford’s
compelling critique, and that is to see whether or not our being cognizant of this
projective mechanism while so projecting makes any difference to the efficacy of
Stroud’s regularity thesis. I am convinced that it does. Clearly, if we are aware that we
are in effect projecting each time that we attribute necessary connections to objects (and
events), then no room is left for speculation on either Hume’s, Stanford’s, or our part.
That is to say, if we recognize the origin o f our idea o f necessity as consisting in this
mechanism, then we can understand how we can conceive of the idea without, however,
assenting to its actual existence. In other words, we recognize the projection as a quality
of our mind rather than as a quality in the objects of the material world.

84 For example, Simon Blackburn as identified in Stanford.
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B. The ‘Psychological’ Strain
Stanford’s psychologically-based construal is very similar to this line of thought.
Although he conceives o f his account as “a neglected alternative,” designating it a
“semantic interpretation,” it is ultimately nothing other than a species of the
psychological strain. Arguing against what he construes to be the ‘simplistic’ semantic
view,85 he claims that “Hume rejects the existence of objective necessary connections or
causal powers as literally incoherent or meaningless, but on subtle and sophisticated
semantic grounds, rather than simplistic ones.” Here Stanford is making a direct claim
against a fundamental premise of the psychological line of reasoning, namely that Hume
believes that the very idea of necessity is itself meaningless.86 Against this alleged
misreading, Stanford asserts that he “will defend the explicitly semantic interpretation
that Hume rejects the existence o f causal powers or necessary connections in objects, and
that he does so precisely because he finds the supposition that there are such objective
causal powers or objective necessary connections to be strictly unintelligible and
incoherent, rather than merely false or skeptically immodest.” Remarking that “Hume’s
semantic argument is considerably more sophisticated than its standard portrayal,” he
notes, however, that “this is not to revert to a naive or positivistic reading of Hume’s
On

argument.”

Stanford’s italicization o f the term ‘objective’ holds the key to what he

alleges to be his original perspective. He formulates this line of thought in terms of what
85 In footnote number 1 Stanford identifies the simplistic analysis as what is commonly referred to as the
‘positivist’ reading o f Hume, according to which “Hume takes his Theory o f Ideas to straightforwardly
imply that ‘necessary connection’ cannot be assigned any coherent meaning at all, and that our talk o f
‘cause’ can mean nothing more than regular succession.” Against this, he declares: “As we will see, the
rich semantic argument Hume actually makes rejects both o f these claims.” Stanford, op. cit.
86 Stanford’s summary supports Broughton’s classification and the basis o f the distinction between the
‘epistemological’ and ‘psychological’ veins that make up the regularity view.
87 Ibid., 339-340.
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he identifies as ‘The Choice’ provided by Hume between “attempting to construe
expressions that attribute powers and necessary connections to beings and objects
literally and objectively (in which case we must find them to be altogether meaningless)
and adopting an alternative understanding of the content of such attributions on which a
defensible meaning can be attributed to them after all.”

88

This alternative understanding,

in turn, consists of appreciating the role taken up by the mind, or more specifically, “the
felt determination o f the mind”.89 More precisely, Stanford claims that the idea of
necessity arises as a function of ‘this felt determination of the mind’, which is to say just
that experience in us o f the repeated constant conjunction of like objects. Accordingly, it
is to this subjective experience that terms like necessity (‘power,’ ‘force,’ ‘energy’)
actually refer. Thus understood, the above-cited reference to ‘objective’ underscores the
distinction the ‘simplistic’ account fails to make between what Hume takes to be the
objective and the subjective senses of the meaning of ‘necessity’—between necessity
understood as that which exists in external objects90 as they are in themselves and as that
which exists only in our minds, respectively. Put another way, Stanford’s semantic
interpretation consists in the view that Hume denies the objective existence of necessary
connections while, however, affirming their subjective existence. That is, Hume is not—
as against the ‘positivist’ construal—making the stronger claim that necessity is (wholly)
meaningless but only the weaker claim that it is meaningful insofar as it refers to the
content of our mind and/or experience.

88 Ibid., 341; emphases in original.
89 Ibid., 340.
90 Which is to say, as a relation that exists between objects.
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But Stanford’s interpretation ultimately amounts to simply making explicit what
is already implicit in the psychological account: for Hume, the intelligibility of the idea
of necessity hinges on the sense in which it is understood. In fact, this is the line of
reasoning Stroud also understood Hume to be taking. In other words, it is precisely
because Hume appreciates the objective-versus-subjective distinction91 that he allows for
a projective mechanism which, given this very appreciation, he can nonetheless identify
as being false.92 In effect, the psychological reading takes it for granted that the point at
issue is the idea of necessity understood objectively. Clearly, it does not deny that
necessity understood as a quality of (the content) of the mind is incoherent. But this is
hardly the point. In fact, no one involved in the discussion over Hume’s conception of
necessity would deny that he does not believe the term to be intelligible at the level of the
subjective. On the contrary, the question governing, and consequently the reason for, the
recent debate taking place between Old and New Hume scholarship is whether or not
Hume believes in the objective existence of necessary connections and not merely in the
existence o f regularity. Consequently, Stanford’s distinction is unwarranted; what is
envisioned as an original semantic contribution dissolves into a variation of the
psychological strain. To be sure, I think this is a function of the strength of the latter
rather than the weakness o f the former. Perhaps more accurately, this is due to the fact
that a consistent reading o f Hume presupposes an appreciation for his overarching aim as
indicated in the subtitle o f the Treatise, namely the study of ‘man’—whether of his mind
more generally or of his overall nature.
91 Stroud articulates this in terms o f Hume’s theory o f ideas and his particular theory o f the mind.
92 Here again, the possibility o f interpreting Hume along agnostic lines presents itself. It is important to
note, however, that Stroud is not here reading Hume as neutral on the issue, but rather as denying the
possibility for the objective existence o f causal powers.
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The psychological view, at least, is clearly premised on this assumption. And it is
for this reason that any semantic construal necessarily falls back on a psychological
account. Put another way, Hume’s theory of meaning (ideas) is undergirded by a focus
on human psychology—i.e. the ways in which the human mind (and its cognitive
faculties) operates with respect to notions such as necessity. This emerges clearly in
Stanford’s analysis. Expressions such as necessity, force, power, etc., are intelligible to
us because we— via (causal) language—know what we mean by the terms; but their
semantic content ultimately refers to that ‘subjective felt determination of the mind’93 in
the absence of which none of these expressions would properly speaking have any .
content. Thus understood, Stanford’s strictly semantic interpretation constitutes, at best,
a partial reading o f Hume’s treatment of causation. Any adequate account necessarily
invokes a psychologically based analysis of the (origin of the) idea of necessity.
My critique o f these respective construals follows, however, from the attempt to
defend the standard regularity line of reasoning against its rival causal realist counterpart.
In other words, what is o f relevance to my argument is not which interpretation proves
the stronger one but rather that both of them, insofar as they are premised on the
assumption that Hume considers necessity as nothing other than a subjective
phenomenon,94 prove superior to any New Hume reading.95 Having presented the two
strains of the regularity view, I turn in the next chapter to a discussion of three exemplars
of the realist line o f thought with a view to revealing the inadequacy of New Hume
commentary as an accurate portrayal of Hume’s position on the subject.
93 Ibid., 342.
94 In other words, the constant conjunction o f like objects and the associated inference o f the mind.
95 To this end, Stanford’s interpretation proves more consistent with Hume’s general project than Stroud’s.
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Chapter 3: THE ‘NEW HUME’

In the preceding chapter, I outlined the standard view according to which Hume is
held to subscribe to a regularity theory of causation. In this chapter, I shall present and
discuss what has more recently emerged as an alternate reading.96 Before I proceed to
this, however, an important issue needs to be addressed, namely the confusion
surrounding the precise nature of the stance of New Humeans with respect to Hume’s
belief in causal powers. For while it has become standard practice to label the New
Hume reading as the ‘causal realist’ view, there appears to be disagreement—mainly on
the part of New Humeans themselves— as to whether a causal realist defense is
compatible with an agnostic line of interpretation. Put another way, there appears to be
some disagreement as to whether New Hume readings ought to be understood as
portraying Hume as agnostic or as positively affirmative regarding the objective
existence o f causal powers.
Some New Humeans, such as Kail, for example, would dispute the commonlyheld assumption articulated by Winkler that they endorse that “Hume is a causal realist—
a more or less firm believer in objective necessary connections.”97 According to Kail,
this is an inaccurate characterization—“What unites these readings is simply the rejection
of a positive regularity reading of Hume and nothing more.”98 I disagree with Kail’s

96 As P.J.E. Kail puts it, “During the 1980s John Wright, Edward Craig, and Galen Strawson (among
others) argued strenuously against this reading.. . . Such readings also attracted the title o f the New Hume,
an umbrella term originating from an important article by Ken Winkler.” P.J.E. Kail. “Is Hume a Causal
Realist?” British Journal fo r the History o f Philosophy 11 (2003): 509.
97 Kenneth P. Winkler, “The New Hume,” The Philosophical Review C: 4 (1991): 541.
98 Kail, op cit., 512.
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assessment." In fact, as I shall shortly demonstrate, New Hume scholars are not neutral,
but emphatic—meaning affirmative—with respect to Hume’s belief in causal powers.100
I am, in other words, arguing against the reasonable possibility of construing New Hume
commentary along agnostic lines. My analysis of the New Hume strain is based on the
respective arguments of Broughton, Wright, and Strawson. I include Broughton’s piece
primarily for practical reasons, since her analysis touches, though superficially so, upon
many if not all o f the core features that are developed and elaborated upon by Wright and
Strawson. Against Kail, I shall show that the causal realist construal is founded on several
central themes as exemplified in each of the latter’s accounts, namely: (1) Hume’s theory
of ideas; (2) Newton’s influence upon Hume’s project; (3) the two imperfect definitions
of “cause”; (4) Hume’s doctrine of natural beliefs; and (5) the nature of Humean
skepticism. I shall begin with Broughton’s analysis.

A. Broughton
The fundamental premise uniting New Humeans is the claim that Hume’s
skepticism vis a vis the intelligibility of the idea of necessary connections is directed at
the capacity o f the human mind—i.e. the capacity o f our cognitive structure—rather than
99 Kail argues against what he alleges to be the miscontrual o f the New Hume position, namely, that “Hume
believed that we can know that causal powers.. .exist in the world.” Kail, op. cit., 512. Citing Craig,
Wright, and Strawson’s analyses as counter-examples, he reasons that Craig remains agnostic on the
question while Wright and Strawson maintain that “Hume ju st assumed that there were hidden necessary
connections.” (emphasis in original) This being said, Kail is prepared to grant that very occasionally
Strawson claims that we can know that there are hidden necessary connections,” however, with the proviso,
“but (note please) he says that this is putting ‘the point more provocatively’.” (ibid) Or, in other words,
“for the most part Strawson thinks Hume just took the matter for granted or never bothered to question the
existence o f power.” This follows from the fact that “The point was that the texts suggested that Hume
assumed there were unknowable causal powers (or was agnostic according to Craig).” (ibid) However,
apart from the detail that Kail does not indicate what he takes Strawson to mean by “provocatively”, his
reference is additionally to an argument that appears in Strawson’s earlier work, Secret Connexions.
Strawson makes no such suggestion in his most recent articulation, which serves as the basis o f my reading
here.
100 This is also why I think the term “skeptical realism” in relation to New Hume scholarship is misapplied.
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at the actuality or reality o f the objective existence of necessary connections understood
as a relation between objects.101 Put another way, the reason that we cannot observe
causal powers is due to nothing other than human ignorance.

1C\0

Accordingly, the realist

vein takes Hume’s references to ‘secret powers’ and ‘unknown qualities’ as evidence in
his belief of causal powers. This line of thought emerges clearly in Broughton’s analysis:
Hume’s views about necessary connection, or causal power, are roughly
parallel. [Hume] does not doubt that we may speak meaningfully o f
objective necessary connection - if we mean just some unknown quality in
objects that underlies the constant conjunction o f their sensible qualities.103

Her reference to “unknown qualities” points to her essential claim that “we have a sort of
bare thought of necessary connection.”104 However, beyond this she concedes that Hume
believes we are “doomed to failure.”105 For further support of Hume’s acknowledgement
of ‘secret’ powers she cites the following passage from the Inquiry, “the bread, which I
formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time,
endowed with such secret powers”106, and on this basis posits that “he argues only that it
does not follow that other bread much must also nourish me at another time, and that like
sensible qualities must always be extended with like secret powers.” She continues,
against the psychological strain, that “in both these passages, Hume at least appears to
use ‘power’ to refer to something in the object” and concludes that “[these passages]
1011 am taking events and actions as included in the category o f objects.
102 This line o f interpretation is defended by Kail. “Powers are hidden because we can conceive cause
without effect and because we cannot make the requisite a priori inferences. But that is not to show the
notion is incoherent. It just shows that our cognitive faculties are not up to the task o f acquainting us with
necessity.” Kail, op. cit., 518; emphasis in original.
103 Broughton, op. cit., 218.
104 Ibid., 235.
105 Ibid., 218.
106 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f Morals,
ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 34.
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imply.. .that Hume is happy to allow that in speaking of powers, we can and do mean
something in objects, not a sort of feeling of ours.”

10 7

Broughton’s analysis draws heavily on the alleged parallel between Newton’s
conception o f gravitational forces and Hume’s discussion of necessary connections.
That is to say, Newton believes in the objective existence of these forces while
maintaining that we cannot discover their nature, just as Hume believes in the objective
existence of necessary connections while holding that we cannot discover its underlying
nature. In fact, Broughton’s thesis centres on this identification. Arguing that Newton’s
claims regarding these forces are of three kinds—namely realist, methodological, and
epistemological108— she reinterprets Hume’s articulation of necessity accordingly.
Broughton’s identification o f the realist analogue in Hume captures her thesis: “We do in
a sense have an idea of necessary connections; we can form the bare thought just of there
being some feature o f objects that underlies the constant conjunctions of their observable
qualities.”109 Here Broughton is introducing a line of reasoning that is, as we shall see
shortly, explicitly defended by Strawson. Broughton’s contention is that our ability to
form the bare thought o f an underlying quality in objects responsible for the experience
of constant conjunction by us, is not—as against the psychological view— simply an
internal impression or a subjective feeling on our part, but in fact points to some

107 Ibid., 228.
108 The realist claim is that “there are gravitational forces; they are among the qualities o f bodies”; the
methodological claim is that “we investigate these forces when we observe certain measurable qualities in
bodies and formulate functions relating these measurements”; finally, the epistemological claim is that “no
one knows anything more about gravitational forces than this: They are those qualities in bodies that
account for certain qualities we can observe” (230).
109 Ibid., 235.
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unknown,110 yet actual, quality in the objects. She is, in effect, making a claim which is
fully developed in Strawson: that that which accounts for our experience(s) of the
observed constant conjunctions of objects, are the “secret powers”, “unknown qualities”
and/or “necessary connections” in objects of which we can form the bare thought, but of
which we are incapable o f discovering the nature. This is precisely why they are ‘secret’
powers, or ‘unknown’ qualities. Now Hume certainly believes they exist - why else
would he refer to them?—but he is simply claiming that we are, and shall remain,
ignorant o f their (actual) nature, just as Newton believed in the actual existence of
gravitational forces but denied our ability to grasp their nature. Parenthetically, it is
worth noting that Broughton is not interested in examining the relevance of Hume’s
theory of ideas, being instead satisfied only to allude to it in passing: “I myself am now
inclined to agree with Michael Wrigley, who has argued that Hume never said that words
lack meaning when they lack an associated ‘idea’;”111 but she offers nothing in the way
of an argument to support this claim, a rather surprising omission given its centrality in
Hume’s empiricist philosophy in general, and in either of the rival readings, more
specifically.

B. Wright
Broughton’s reference to ‘meaning’ enjoys elaboration in Wright, via Hume’s
doctrine of natural beliefs, as against his theory of ideas according to which it is
presumed that all intelligible ideas must be derived from impressions. Since, however,
‘necessity’ does not correspond with an impression, as it is not observable in objects (i.e.

110 and perhaps unknowable
1,1 Ibid., 236.
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the relations among them), Old Humeans claim that Hume intends that the very idea of
necessary connection is itself meaningless

112

and thereby serves as proof of his denial of

causal power. Winkler, for example, argues that “the scope of the theory seems to be
universal, and its force unforgiving: it seems to say that an alleged thought or conception
lacking an appropriate pedigree is unintelligible or meaningless.”113 Strawson provides a
similar explication. According to him, Old Humeans construe Hume’s theory of ideas as
claiming that “all we can suppose a thing to be is what we can detect or experience or
know of it, simply because we cannot manage to mean anything more than what we can
detect or experience or know of it, when we think or talk about it.”114 In order to get
around this problem, New Hume commentators, such as Wright, want to draw a
distinction between ideas (or knowledge claims) and beliefs. In other words, as Winkler
explains, some New Hume proponents “narrow the scope of the theory by suggesting
there are thoughts or conceptions to which the theory does not apply . . . [and] others
dampen the theory’s force by suggesting that what is unintelligible, meaningless or
absurd in Hume’s sense is not unintelligible, meaningless, or absurd in our sense.”115
Broadly speaking, each of the latter classes originates in what New Hume
commentators claim is the distinction Hume presupposes to exist between conceiving and
supposing, or alternately, between conceptions and suppositions. This alleged distinction
has its source in the following argument from the Treatise:

112 That is, unintelligible, incoherent, etc.
113 Winkler, op. cit., 552.
114 Strawson “Objects” 34.
115 Winkler, op. cit., 552.
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Since we may suppose, but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object
and impression; any conclusion we form concerning the connexion and repugnance o f
impressions, will not be known certainly to be applicable to objects . . . ,116

This passage supports Winkler’s assertion. Clearly, Hume’s discussion is here limited to
external objects. Wright (similarly Strawson), however, wants to extend the account to
include causation. “It is clear then,” he writes, “that at least in his discussion of external
existence, Hume argues that we are not limited in our beliefs (or suppositions) about
objects to what is based on our legitimate impression-derived ideas (or conceptions).”
“Why then,” he asks, “should there be an exception in the case of Hume’s discussion of
causality?”117 His own answer is that there is no such exception, and it is not hard to find
his reason for this answer. For beliefs, or beliefs in external objects, prove central to
Wright’s argument regarding Hume’s treatment of necessity. That is to say, Wright
believes that Hume’s allowance for “fundamental beliefs .. . based on inconceivable
suppositions”118 such as the belief in the existence of external119 objects is applicable, and
in fact ought to be extended to, his discussion of causation. In other words, Wright’s
resolution of the seemingly insurmountable dilemma o f the inapplicability of
impressionless ideas as posed by Hume’s theory o f ideas is to reason that, just as Hume
holds that we have natural beliefs in external objects that are, properly speaking,
inconceivable, so we may also have natural beliefs in causal powers.
Contrary to the traditional view, according to Wright, then, Hume does draw a
distinction between that which we can conceive and that which we can suppose; we may
116 Hume, op. cit., 41.
117 John P. Wright, “Hume’s Causal Realism,” in The new Hume debate, eds. Rupert Read and Kenneth A.
Richman (New York: Routledge, 2000), 90.
118 Ibid., 89.
119 That is, mind-independent
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not be able to conceive o f causal powers in objects, but we certainly can suppose (i.e.
believe) them to exist. He is convinced that Hume holds this to be the case, as is shown
by the following: “On the surface it is clear not only that Hume thinks that people can
believe that there are causal powers in objects but generally do believe it” and by his
citation of this passage from the Inquiry.
the more common and familiar operations o f nature - such as the descent o f heavy
bodies, the growth o f plants, the generation o f animals, or the nourishment o f bodies
by food . . . the generality o f mankind. . . suppose that, in all these cases, they
perceive the very force or energy o f the cause, by which it is connected with its effect,
and is for ever infallible in its operation.120

Wright comments that “the supposition referred to here shows that before philosophy
enters the picture we are all direct realists about causal power.”

11 1

In other words, Hume

is a causal realist and maintains that we all hold a natural belief in causal power, as is
made explicit in Wright’s assertion that “it is important to stress that Hume holds that the
belief in the objectivity of power is, if anything, more firmly implanted in human nature
than the natural belief in external existence.”
The reason we cannot discover the nature of causal power is, just as Broughton
argues, due to human ignorance, specifically to “our ignorance of unknown powers
[which] is not characterized by Hume as an ignorance of further regularities or constant
conjunctions o f objects,.. . [but] is characterized as a certain lack of understanding—that
is, of the intelligible connection of cause and effect.”123 And while Wright concedes that
“it is true that Hume says we have ‘no idea of this connexion’ {E ll) because we never

120 Enquiries, op. cit., 69.
121 Wright, op. cit., 89.
122 Ibid.
123 Wright, op. cit., 93.
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find any instance of it,” he insists that “[Hume] clearly knows exactly what it is for there
to be such an objective connection”124 The inadequacy of our idea of necessary
connections points, not to the fact that it is unjustified or meaningless since necessary
connections are non-existent, but rather to the limits of our cognitive capabilities. As
Wright explicates, “Hume consistently explains our lack of knowledge of power or
necessary connection through the imperfection (£76), deficiency (7217) or inadequacy of
our ideas. It is this last term which is particularly revealing of Hume’s intentions.” In the
Treatise Hume writes that we have ‘no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object’
(7160).”125 Wright cites an excerpt from the Treatise126 wherein Hume “had identified
the adequacy of ideas as a condition of knowledge.”

19 7

According to Wright, “this is

exactly what Hume believes is the case in terms of causation. Our ideas of cause and
effect are distinct and therefore do not reveal the necessary or conceptual connection of
objects. This is why Hume concludes that our ideas are inadequate”.128
The “inadequacy” argument is a variation on the meaninglessness thesis; our
ideas of cause and effect129 are inadequate130 because of the non-existence of an
associated idea (impression). Wright’s counter to this is to say that our ideas of necessary

124 Ibid., 93.
125 Ibid.
126 “Wherever ideas are adequate representations o f objects, the relations, contradictions, and agreements o f
the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe to be the foundation o f all
human knowledge.” Ibid., 29.
127 Ibid., 93.
128 Ibid.
129 In other words, causal powers, necessary connections, etc.
130 That is, meaningless, unintelligible, incoherent, etc.
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connections are inadequate because they are incapable of revealing the nature of the
cause and effect relation. Notice the similarity here with Broughton’s argument.
Wright assumes a similar line of reasoning with reference to Hume’s two
definitions o f cause. In the Inquiry, Hume defines cause as follows:
1) an object follow ed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first,
are follow ed by objects similar to the second.
2) where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.13'

According to Wright, Hume is not defining cause in terms of regularity since he
explicitly acknowledges that his definitions are imperfect. That is to say, “His reason for
considering the first definition of causality to be problematic is that it defines the cause,
not in terms of its relation to the effect, but rather in terms of its relation to other similar
objects.” 132 And as for the second description, “The inadequacy o f the second definition
lies in the fact that causality is defined in terms of the reaction of the mind to the
observation of the constant conjunction of similar objects. This too is clearly extraneous
and foreign to the causal relation itself’.133 Thus understood, Hume believes that the two
definitions o f cause are imperfect for the same reason he thinks our idea o f causality
inadequate, namely, because in either case it fails to reveal the nature of the causal
relation.
As further support o f Hume’s alleged causal realism, Wright endorses the
projectivist tendency o f the mind, but against Broughton, Stroud, and Kail, he holds that
the projective mechanism is not false. In other words, the mind does not need to add
anything new to itself in order to be able to project necessity onto objects, as he reiterates
131 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1st ed., Charles W. Hendel, ed.
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., [1748] 1976), 87.
132 Ibid., 91.
133 Ibid.
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in response to having examined the Treatise Book I, Parts 3, §14 (“O f the Idea of
Necessary Connexion”) and 4, §4 (“Of the Antient Philosophy”), as well as the Inquiry
§7 (“Of the Idea o f Necessary Connexion”). According to Wright, “in these accounts he
dispenses with the need to postulate any separate projecting mechanism: he does not
consider ‘necessity’ as if it were a distinct inner impression separable from the
perceptions of cause and effect themselves. Rather, it is nothing but the felt connection
between them which is produced by custom and habit.”134 In short, Wright maintains that
Hume is not only a realist about necessary connections as a relation between objects,
but—as evidenced from his account of the belief in external existence—additionally
acknowledges that we all have a natural belief in causal power. This, he argues, is
supported by Hume’s skepticism, but Wright does not himself offer much in the way of
explanation, being satisfied only to point out the ‘“more mitigated scepticism or
academical philosophy which Hume adopts at the end of his Enquiry . . . .”135
Wright’s Hume assumes a very naturalistic tone, affirming, for instance, “that our
‘philosophical decisions’ must be based on the ‘reflections o f common life’, though these
must be ‘methodized and corrected’.”136 For Wright, “this implies that the academic
philosopher should succumb to judgements o f ‘common life’ such as the judgement that
there are objective causal powers in the objects which we experience as constantly
conjoined, but he or she needs to correct the false supposition that these powers can be
perceived by us.”137 Further, as with Broughton, Wright underscores the Newtonian

134 Wright, op. cit., 94.
135 Ibid., 95.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
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influence. Referring to note 32 in Part 1 § 7 of the Inquiry,138 Wright argues that “Hume
denied that Newton intended to ‘rob Matter o f all force or Energy’” and only withdrew
his comment after criticism. Even still, Wright remarks: “Hume clearly continued to
endorse the speculation that there are active, motion producing powers in nature itself.”139
As Wright sees it, “this alone should convince us that Hume did not close off all
‘speculation about objective causal powers’, as Winkler claims .. . and that such
speculation is possible even though we cannot, strictly speaking, conceive of that which
we are supposing. ,,1 4 0

C. Strawson
Galen Strawson offers, to my mind, the most convincing of the revisionist
readings. The strength o f his analysis lies in both the breadth and depth of its coverage.
As shall shortly become clear, Strawson covers, refines, and gives full and sometimes
original articulation to points implicit in Broughton, and touched on by Wright141 while
also making entirely original contributions to the debate.142 Strawson declares that Hume
“not only thinks that a straightforwardly realist view of objects and causation is coherent

138 The relevant part o f the note reads: “It was never the meaning o f Sir Isaac Newton to rob second causes
o f all force or energy
139 Ibid., 96.
140 Ibid.
141 while sharing in a fundamental premise with him, namely, that the traditional view o f Hume’s theory o f
ideas originates in a failure to appreciate the nature o f his skepticism
142 It is worth noting that Strawson’s causal realist reading o f Hume originates in his 1989 book The Secret
Connexion. I have opted to base my analysis on a more recent article, “Objects and Power” in which many
o f the arguments appearing in the earlier publication are recast and therefore offers an accurate and most
recent articulation o f his views. I shall also examine his 1987 piece, “Realism and Causation”, in which the
genesis o f his thoughts on the subject appears.
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and intelligible; he standardly takes it for granted that such a view is true.”143 In a
footnote regarding the Producing Causation theory—i.e. according to which the
regularities we observe between objects are held to be something beyond mere regular
succession—Strawson writes: “Hume’s position is complex, and perhaps not entirely
consistent. . . . Often, however, he writes in an apparently Straightforward Realist way;
and when he does so he appears to espouse a full-blooded Producing Causation view.
The following quotation is entirely typical of Hume in his Realist fram e o f mind: ‘The
scenes of the universe are continually shifting .. . and never discovers itself in any way of
the sensible qualities o f body’ (E pp. 63-4).”144 Strawson comments: “On this view ‘the
power or force which activates the whole machine’, and whose existence is the reason
why things happen in regular ways, is certainly real, although we can never know
anything about its nature. It is something over and above regular succession, and there is
succession because there is this ‘[actuating] power of force’. There are dozens of similar
apparently straightforwardly referring uses of expressions like ‘power’, ‘energy’, ‘force’
to be found in his writings.”145
Strawson gives full articulation to a point partially contained, although inferable
from Broughton, namely that the standard regularity reading is false because it confuses
Hume’s epistemological claim—i.e. that all we can know of necessity is constant

143 Strawson, “Objects”, 48. This statement directly contradicts Kail’s claim; see p. 33 above.
144 Strawson, “Realism”, 275n; emphases mine.

145 Ibid.; emphases mine. Interestingly, these references are limited to the Enquiry. Indeed, in the more
recent piece, Strawson argues that it is the Enquiry, and not the Treatise, that ought to count as a reliable
source for Hume’s thoughts on causality, and this despite his own acknowledgement that the ‘Oxford
University Examination Decrees for the History o f Philosophy’ specifies that Hume must be studied in
connection with the Treatise rather than the Enquiry. See Strawson, “Objects”, 32, 49.
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conjunction (or regular succession)—with his ontological claim—i.e. that all that
necessity is is constant conjunction (or regular succession).146 This distinction, to which
Strawson gives explicit expression, is a fundamental New Hume tenet. Reiterating both
Broughton and Wright’s claim, the issue is one of human ignorance. In other words,
“The conclusion, then, is a conclusion about human ignorance. There is more to
causation, but we are ignorant of it”.147 Further, restating reasoning that appears both in
Broughton as well as in his earlier article, Strawson asserts that, “[Hume] takes it for
granted that there must be something about the world in virtue o f which the world is
regular.” Indeed, he is so convinced of this that he goes on to declare: “the point he [i.e.
Hume] cherishes and wants to drive home, spectacularly contrary to the orthodoxy of his
time, is simply that we have no positive descriptive conception of the nature of causal
power.”148 His reference to a ‘positive descriptive conception’ points to an original
contribution on his part to the suppose (supposition) versus conceive (conception)
distinction that Wright discusses in relation to Hume’s theory o f ideas. As with Wright,
Strawson believes we ought to take Hume’s treatment of external objects together with
his views on causation. Now there is nothing new about this line of reasoning; in fact, it
constitutes a principal New Hume claim, but Strawson provides a rather novel rendering.
Citing the famous passage from which the suppose-versus-conceive distinction is
alleged to originate (“we may suppose but never can conceive a specific difference
betwixt an object and an impression” [7241]), Strawson reasons as follows: “anything

146 Or, alternatively, “Hume’s regularity theory o f causation is only a theory about causation so far as we
can know o f it in the objects, not about causation as it is in the objects.” Ibid., 33.
147 Strawson, “Objects”, ibid.
148 Ibid., 42.
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that is to count as a genuine conception of something must be descriptively contentful on
the terms o f the theory o f ideas: it must have directly impression-based, impression-copy
content.” On the contrary, a supposition that something exists or is the case can be a
genuine supposition, genuinely about something, and hence intelligible in our present-day
sense, without being contentful (or meaningful or intelligible) on the terms of the theory
of ideas.”149 In fact, Strawson contrues this as an ‘important’ and ‘routine’ distinction.
Intelligibility for Hume, then, according to Strawson, ought to be understood in terms of
positively descriptive content. That is to say, conceptions must have content in order to
be intelligible. However, the lack of positively descriptive content does not entail non
existence, but rather only the inability to be described, observed, and/or discovered. Like
Wright, Strawson is arguing that we may suppose that causal power exists, and hence
have an intelligible idea o f it— although we cannot conceive it— i.e. cannot form any
conception o f it.
As with Wright, Strawson points to Hume’s treatment of external objects—or
rather, our belief in external existence—as the legitimate source of this distinction.
Citing the relevant source from the Treatise: “The farthest we can go towards a
conception o f objects, when [they are] suppos’d specifically different from our
perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the
related objects,”150 Strawson declares that “This is the farthest we can go; external

149 Ibid., 37.
150 Interestingly enough, this quote is from the Treatise (T68).
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objects are ‘incomprehensible’; we have only a ‘relative’ idea of them. But a relative
idea of X is not no idea at all.”151 Thus, just like Wright, Strawson wants to equate
Hume’s treatment o f external objects with his metaphysics o f causation: just as we have a
relative idea o f external objects, so too we have a relative idea o f causal power; more
specifically, “in the case o f Causation, our merely relative idea of it is that in reality in
virtue of which reality is regular in the way that it is; or, in Hume’s terms, it is ‘the power
or force, which actuates the whole machine of the universe . .. (is63).”152
Strawson shares with Wright another basic premise, namely one concerning the
nature of Hume’s skepticism. While Wright coined the term “sceptical realism,”153 he
only touches upon the subject. Strawson by comparison deals with the designation in
much greater detail, arguing that Hume’s skepticism presupposes his theory of ideas
which rests, in turn, on the suppose-versus-conceive distinction. Strawson is fully aware
that support for the collapse o f the distinction discovers its source in Hume’s skepticism.
That is to say, the consistency of Hume’s skeptical outlook entails that he neither affirm
nor deny the idea o f necessary connections.154 Strawson’s solution is to distinguish, like
Wright, between knowledge claims and beliefs, or more accurately, to limit Hume’s
theory of ideas to knowledge claims, while acknowledging the validity and naturalness of
beliefs falling outside its scope: “Scepticism of the Humean kind does not say that these
beliefs are definitely not true, or unintelligible, or utterly contentless.. . . [Indeed,]
genuine belief in the existence of X is fully compatible with strict scepticism with regard

151 Ibid., 36.
152 Ibid., 36-37
153 See Kail, 509.
154 In chapter 4 , 1 shall argue that this is not the only possible alternative.
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to knowledge claims about the existence of X.”155 Put alternatively, Hume’s skeptical
realism presupposes distinguishing between our knowledge claims (conceptions) and our
beliefs (suppositions). As Strawson sees it, the traditional construal of Hume’s theory of
ideas runs counter to his skepticism. That is, “Hume does not make positive claims about
what definitely does exist (apart from mental occurrences or ‘perceptions’, whose
existence he rightly takes as certain). But, equally, clearly, he does not make positive
claims about what definitely (or knowably) does not exist.”156 And if we are still
unconvinced o f Hume’s skeptical realism: “he repeatedly distinguishes between the
‘sensible qualities’ o f objects, on the one hand, and the objects themselves and their
‘secret’157 or unknown nature or internal structure, on the other hand. Whenever he does
so, he is ipso facto thinking o f objects in a realist fashion as something more than
perceptions (as something more than idealist or phenomenalist).”

1 CO

Strawson, however, concedes that his circumscription of Hume’s theory o f ideas
appears somewhat problematic: “it is true that Hume’s empiricist theory of ideas, strictly
and literally interpreted, creates some pressure on him to [talk about necessity in terms of
regular succession].” However, he is quick to point out that “this pressure is comfortably
offset by his scepticism and realism.” Accordingly, “the strict and literal interpretation of
Hume’s theory of meaning is not Hume’s interpretation and in fact he takes it for

155 Ibid., 34-35; emphases in original.
156 Ibid., 34.
157 See also Broughton.
158 Ibid., 40-41.
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granted159 that there is Causation”.160 Acknowledging that Hume’s theory o f ideas would
appear to preclude the meaningful use of terms such as ‘power’ and ‘force’, Strawson
reasons: “and yet he allows in practice that they can manage to mean something like
Causation,161 at least in the sense of genuinely referring to it.”162 Strawson, however, is
undisturbed, positing that his reading presents “at most a tension . . . [but] not an
inconsistency,”

1£ 1

explaining that “the tension arises because our understanding of words

like ‘meaning’ and ‘intelligible’ is not the same as Hume’s.” 164
Strawson shares with Broughton a similar line of reasoning on Hume’s position
with regard to induction. The reason Hume does not think that “induction is rationally
justifiable by appeal to past experience” is not because necessary connections do not
actually - i.e. objectively - exist, but “simply that past experience can never provide a
guarantee that the secret nature of bodies will not change in the future, bringing change in
their effects and influence.”165 Strawson takes this reading as undermining the
supposition that the regularity view is supported by Hume’s inductive skepticism; on the
contrary, “the argument for inductive scepticism . . . appeals essentially to Causation.”166
Just as with Broughton and Wright, Newton figures largely as clear proof, for Strawson,

159 See also Broughton
160 Ibid., 41.
161 Strawson’s definition
162 Ibid.; see also Broughton; emphasis in original.
163 Ibid., 41-42.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid., 43; see also Broughton.
166 Ibid.
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of Hume’s realism with respect to causation. Strawson’s assessment of the similarities
between the two thinkers is unmistakable. To his mind, “Hume never really questions the
idea that there is Causation, something in virtue of which reality is regular in the way that
it is.” Restating Broughton’s claim, Strawson continues: “Following Newton, he
repeatedly insists on the epistemological claim that we know nothing of the ultimate
nature o f Causation . . . . We cannot know the nature of Causation.” However, as he
immediately makes clear, “this is not to doubt that Causation exists.”167 Elsewhere,
Strawson posits that Hume was a “follower o f Newton” although he provides no context
for the assertion.168 Two pages on, he argues that Hume, “following Newton, here as
elsewhere . . . goes on to say that we can greatly simplify our account of the laws of
nature, reducing it to a ‘few general causes’,” and points out that Hume believes that
these laws “certainly exist.”169 While he acknowledges that “this natural reading is
doubted by those who think all Hume’s apparently referring uses of Causation terms are
really ironic”170 he counters that “they ignore his admiration for Newton.”171 Finally,
Strawson echoes Wright’s line of reasoning with respect to Hume’s self-declared
“imperfect” definitions of cause. While he recognizes that “the first description defines
causation as constant conjunction or regular succession and the second defines it in terms
of a feeling o f determination of the mind (£76-7,7170, 172),” he maintains that “both are
held to be imperfect because they cannot representationally encompass causation or

167 Ibid., 35; see also Wright.
168 Ibid., 40.
169 Ibid., 42.
170 See also Broughton
171 Ibid.
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power ‘as it is in itself { E lln). They can define it only by reference to something other
than itself.”172

As evidenced by the foregoing, New Hume commentary shares several central
lines o f reasoning which is, however, opposed to what I have been claiming, namely,
that Hume conceives of necessity as nothing other than regularity in order to establish the
further claim that he cannot properly be understood as espousing a compatibilist position
on the issue o f human freedom and moral responsibility. The question naturally arises as
to how, barring the compatibilist construal, we are to interpret Hume’s discussions of
liberty and necessity in both the Treatise and the Inquiry. In the chapter that follows I
shall attempt to fill out the details of a response to this question while providing textual
evidence against the New Hume interpretation.

172 Ibid., 46.
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Chapter 4: HUME REVISITED

In this chapter I will present my alternative reading. My positive thesis depends
on several key issues. Firstly, I need to establish that Hume can only be understood as a
regularity theorist about causation. Secondly, I need to offer a plausible account as to
why a regularity theorist nonetheless seemingly provides a compatibilist definition of
liberty in the Inquiry—a text generally considered by Hume scholars to be more faithful
to Hume’s actual line of thought than its predecessor. Finally, I need to account for why
commentators have proven satisfied to bifurcate and treat independently Hume’s
necessity and liberty arguments.
Although, as I argued in the second chapter, the standard view of Humean
necessity as consisting in nothing more than regular succession (and the inference of the
mind) is consistent with Hume’s particular thoughts on the subject, it leaves a lot to be
desired in terms of his greater philosophical project, namely, “the science of man.”173 If
the titles of the texts in which his discussions of liberty and necessity appear—i.e. A
Treatise o f Human Nature and An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding—are any
indication, Hume’s conception of necessity must be considered within the context of the
general (philosophical) framework in which he presents it. If the content of Hume
scholarship is any indication, however, his aim has been for the most part vastly
frustrated by supporters on either side of the debate. While proponents of the traditional
vein prove more accurate in their assessment o f Hume’s treatment of necessity, for this
very reason they prove much less consistent in their general position than their realist
counterparts. As I argued in chapter one, a regularity theorist cannot, by definition, hold
173 Hume, op. cit., xviii. Or alternately, “the science o f human nature” as he states in the Inquiry (15).
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a compatibilist thesis. But this is precisely what many Old Hume scholars effectively,
however unwittingly, concede. A survey of the relevant literature reveals that
commentators’ seeming ignorance of the conflicting nature of their position originates in
their simply taking it for granted that Hume is a compatibilist without, however,
appreciating the logical consequences this assumption bears on their regularity defense.
Stanford’s position constitutes one of the most recent examples of this practice.
He is one of a handful o f commentators who, like Botterill and Russell, argues for a more
integrated reading of Hume’s necessity and liberty arguments. This is clearly a move in
the right direction. However, this is precisely why his failure to appreciate the
implications o f his regularity reading is so untenable. Stanford holds that Hume’s
operative conception o f necessity bears directly on his notion of liberty (and vice versa),
but for reasons nowhere stated he does not extend this claim to the compatibilism issue.
To this end, Stanford’s argument is internally inconsistent in a way that Russell’s is not.
This is because Russell makes it clear that a compatibilist needn’t hold a robust
determinist thesis such as causal determinism but a much weaker notion such as a
regularity theory o f causation.174 Stanford makes no such claim, and I am inclined to
think that if he agreed with Russell on this point then he would have articulated as much.
Consequently, his analysis is paradigmatic of the sort of shortsightedness that pervades
Hume literature on the subject.
This deficiency notwithstanding, Stanford’s analysis of Hume’s liberty argument
represents the only example I have come across in the literature that actually construes
Hume’s definition o f freedom in the way that we ought to take it, as I have been claiming
and shall shortly defend. In fact, it is this detail that renders his failure to counter the
174 However, all o f this is question begging, since Hume actually describes him self as a compatibilist.
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compatibilist attribution to Hume so baffling. In other words, Stanford corroborates my
claim that Hume redefines the free will dispute; however, he does not see this
corroboration as entailing the further claim that in reformulating the terms of the debate
Hume cannot, properly speaking, be considered a compatibilist. While I will return to
Stanford’s interpretation o f Hume’s notion of liberty as support for my thesis in the final
section of this chapter, I first need to establish my positive claim that the textual evidence
supports a regularity construal (rather than a realist reading) of Hume’s conception of
necessity. It is to this task that I shall now turn.
In discussing causation—i.e. the relation between cause(s) and effect(s)—Hume
makes it clear that what we observe is nothing other than regularity, as evidenced by his
usage of terms such as ‘constant conjunction,’ ‘regular succession,’ and ‘contiguity’.
However, he acknowledges that “An object may be contiguous and prior to another,
without being consider’d as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be
taken into consideration.”

17 S

•

•

It is this latter relation that is essential to our understanding

of necessity. Hume is clear that we do not actually perceive necessary connections
between the external objects we observe but assume them to exist as a function of our
experience of their constant conjunction. He articulates this as follows.
’Tis therefore by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence o f one object
from that o f another. The nature o f experience is this. We remember to have had
frequent instances o f the existence o f one species o f objects; and also remember,
that the individuals o f another species o f objects have always attended them, and
have existed in a regular order o f contiguity and succession with regard to them...
We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. Without
any farther ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the
existence o f the one from that o f the other. In all those instances, from which
we learn the conjunction o f particular causes and effects, both the causes and effects
have been perceiv’d by the senses, and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein we
reason concerning them, there is only one perceiv’d or remember’d, and the other is

175 Treatise, op. cit., 77.
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supply’d in conformity to our past experience.176

This particular passage reveals that, in addition to the repeated experience of the
constant conjunction of like objects, the origin of our idea of necessity involves also a
second feature: the inference we (our mind) make(s) as a result of this repeated
experience. The content o f this passage is by itself sufficient to establish the case for the
traditional reading. Necessity thus understood is nothing other than: (1) the constant
conjunction of similar objects; along with (2) the inference of the mind from one object
to the next. But here it might be objected that to say that the experience of necessity is
nothing other than this is not to preclude the possibility that necessity as it exists
independently of our minds is something more than this. In other words, Hume’s premise
that we cannot observe necessary connections in the relations between objects does not
establish the claim that he does not believe in the objective existence of necessary
connections. This is precisely the line taken by the New Hume camp. I think, however,
that there is more than enough textual evidence to undermine the basis for such
reasoning.
I do not deny that Hume is at times very ambiguous on this matter. Admittedly,
he sometimes appears to want to distinguish our ability to observe, discover, prove, etc.,
the existence of necessity from its objective existence. This confusion can be observed in
statements such as: “We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a
resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie
beyond the reach of our discovery.”177 Here he does indeed appear to be questioning the

176 Ibid., 87; emphases in original.
177 Ibid., 91-92.
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epistemological rather than the ontological possibility of our discovering necessary
connections. Similar reasoning is apparent with respect to the notion of power:
Upon the whole, we may conclude, that ’tis impossible in any one instance to shew
the principle, in which the force and agency o f a cause is plac’d: and that the most
refined and most vulgar understandings are equally at a loss in this particular. If
any one think proper to refute this assertion, h e .. .may at once shew us an instance
o f a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle.178

However, there is simply too much evidence pointing in the other direction. Most
notable is the following passage wherein, among other things, Hume’s denial of power as
an objective causal source undermines any such line of interpretation.
. ..I am, indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several qualities both in material
and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please
call these pow er or efficacy, ‘twill be o f little consequence to the world. But when,
instead o f meaning these unkown qualities, we make the terms o f power and efficacy
signify something, o f which we have a clear idea, and which is incompatible with
those objects, to which we apply it, obscurity and error begin then to take place, and
we are led astray by a false philosophy. This is the case, when we transfer the
determination o f thought to external objects, and suppose any real intelligible
connexion betwixt them; that being a quality, which can only belong to the mind
that considers them.179

At first glance, Hume appears to begin by conceding the limitations of our cognitive
faculties with respect to adequate knowledge of necessary connections. Upon closer
examination, however, an altogether opposing claim is revealed. Hume’s reference to
‘power’ and ‘efficacy’ as unknown qualities of objects should not be here confused for
reference to unknowable (i.e. indiscoverable) qualities that are the sources accounting for
these observed regularities. The influence of the ‘modem philosophy’ on Hume’s theory
of ideas, as alleged by Stroud, provides a much more consistent alternative explanation.
The ‘unknown qualities’ to which Hume is here referring are none other than those
unrealizable secondary qualities that, while indiscoverable (because unlocalizable) by

1/8 Ibid., 158.
179 Ibid., 168-69
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us, account for the very (primary) qualities that we do perceive in objects. Thus
understood, Hume is simply making the point that he will agree to the use of terms like
power, etc., but only if we are agreed as to what they in fact refer, namely, unknowable
secondary qualities. Put negatively, Hume is not—as against the realist reading—
conceding the mind-independent existence of power or efficacy understood as the
indiscoverable source o f the (necessary) causal relation(s) existing between external
objects.
In fact, Hume’s precise thoughts are contained in the last sentence of the extended
citation above. The belief that necessity is nothing other than the ‘determination of the
thought’ constitutes the core of Hume’s position and appears under various formulations
throughout his treatment of the subject. As I shall demonstrate, the source of this
‘determination’ proves essential to an accurate construal of Hume’s particular account of
causation. It is my claim that Hume provides a psychological-based analysis of the origin
of our idea of necessity. The role of experience looms largely in his empiricist “science
of human nature.” However, the key to understanding Hume’s conception o f necessity is
bound up in the question of exactly what this experience is an experience of, in other
words the question about the content (nature) of the object of our experience. Two
significant points here emerge.
Firstly, conceiving o f Hume’s analysis in this way—quite apart from the textual
evidence above provided—is in itself enough to rule out the plausibility of the New
Hume interpretation. Specifically, it locates the inadequacy of the realist construal in
having missed the point entirely. New Hume commentators fail to appreciate that
Hume’s account of necessity proves irrelevant in the absence of his general philosophy.
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This also accounts for how they are able to misread much of what he has to say on the
subject in order to make their case. This brings me to my second point. While the
standard reading does not misconstrue Hume’s conception of necessity per se, it too fails
to appreciate the complexity of his project. While Hume certainly holds a regularity
thesis as I explicated above, this is not the whole of his point. An accurate reading of
Hume’s treatment o f causation presupposes not only an understanding of his particular
conception of necessity, but more importantly an appreciation for its relevance to and
connection with the rest o f his general line of thought. It is with this goal in my mind that
I shall proceed to fill out the analysis introduced above. As earlier noted, Hume provides
a regularity account o f causation, according to which necessity is defined in terms of (1)
the constant conjunction of like objects and (2) the inference o f the mind. I discussed the
former feature o f this definition above; I shall now examine it in terms of the latter—or,
more precisely, the origin of this inference on our part.
Hume identifies the inference as originating in a belief which derives, in turn,
from a principle o f association or union in the imagination. Thus, for example, in the
Treatise Hume provides the following explanation:
We have no other notion o f cause and effect, but that o f certain objects, which
have been always conjoin’d together, and which in all past instances have been
found inseparable. We cannot penetrate into the reason o f the conjunction. We
only observe the thing itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction
the objects acquire an union in the imagination. When the impression o f one
becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea o f its usual attendant. . . .I8°

Two things are here worth noting. First is the reference to the imagination: in claiming
that the principle o f association (i.e. of cause and effect) resides in the faculty of
imagination, Hume is reiterating the point that the idea of necessary connection derives

1Ibid., 92.
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neither from reasoning

1 R1

nor from sense-based experience. A second and related point is

the notion of repetition, or the experience thereof: it is precisely because the idea of
necessary connection cannot be discovered a priori that we only form the idea of it after
the repeated experience o f the conjunction of similar objects. Hume in fact claims that
this experience o f repetition creates a belief—i.e. an expectation—on our part, that is the
actual source of the idea of necessity. Thus understood, belief is the effect of custom or
habit. That is to say, having on the basis of past experience found two objects always
conjoined together, upon the appearance of the one, we make a transition to the idea of
the other. Hume notes that after the first, initial experience, this belief arises
automatically without time required for reflection or reasoning.
“Now as we call every thing CUSTOM, which proceeds from a past repetition,
without any new reasoning or conclusion, we may establish it as a certain truth,
that all belief, which follows upon any present impression, is deriv’d solely from
that origin. When we are accustom’d to see two impressions conjoin’d together,
the appearance or idea o f the other.”182

Hume provides various formulations of this same line of thought in the Treatise, as well
as the Inquiry.
It appears, then, that this idea o f necessary connection among events arises
from a number o f similar instances, which occur, o f the constant conjunction
o f these events.. .But there is nothing in a number o f instances, different from
every single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar, except only that
after a repetition o f similar instances the mind is carried by habit, upon the
appearance o f one event, to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will
exist. This connection, therefore, which we fe el in the mind, this customary
transition o f the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the
sentiment or impression from which we form the idea o f power or necessary
connection.183

181 For example, a priori (Hendel, Inquiry, 41).
182 Ibid., 102-3.
183 Inquiry, 86; emphases Hendel’s.
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Here he is formulating the description precisely in terms of what Stanford identifies as a
“subjective felt determination of mind.” The origin of our idea of necessary connection
can be traced to that determination of thought that is formed in us after the repeated
experience o f the constant conjunction of similar objects.
It is my claim that Hume’s treatment o f necessity bears directly on his account of
liberty, and, by extension on his position in terms of the free-will debate. The textual
evidence certainly lends itself to my case. Hume opens “Of liberty and necessity” in the
Treatise by providing one o f the most lucid articulations of the foregoing description of
necessity:
It has been observed already, that in no single instance the ultimate connexion
o f any object is discoverable, either by our senses or reason, and that we can
never penetrate so far into the essence and construction o f bodies, as to perceive
the principle, on which their mutual influence depends. ’Tis their constant union
alone, with which we are acquainted; and ’tis from the constant union that
necessity arises. If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with each
other; we shou’d never arrive at any idea o f cause and effect; and even after all,
the necessity, which enters into that idea, is nothing but a determination the mind
to pass from one object to its usual attendant, and infer the existence o f one from
that o f the other.184

Clearly, Hume is defining necessity in terms of regularity; that is, the constant
conjunction of like objects and the associated inference of the mind. And, so as to
prevent any confusion, he makes this even more explicit by identifying the constant union
of objects and the inference of the mind as the “two particulars . . . essential to
necessity.” 185 In the parallel section of the Inquiry, a near-identical description appears:
Our idea, therefore, o f necessity and causation arises entirely from the
uniformity observable in the operations o f nature, where similar objects are
constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer
the one from the appearance o f the other. These two circumstances form the
whole o f that necessity which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant
conjunction o f similar objects and the consequent inference from one to the

184 Treatise, op. cit., 400.
185 Ibid.
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other, we have no notion o f any necessity or connection.186

Most importantly, however, is the identification Hume proceeds to make between
‘natural’ (or ‘physical’) necessity and ‘moral’ necessity. Prior to either of the “O f liberty
and necessity” sections, the focus of Hume’s analysis of necessity was limited to its
relation to the material world of natural events to the preclusion of human actions. In
other words, in the absence o f an account of necessity relating to the moral (or human)
realm, the objection against attempting to connect Hume’s regularity thesis to his position
on the free will issue would be plausible. Hume is, however, clear on the point: as far as
he is concerned, the regularity theory of causation extends into the moral realm. This line
of thought plainly emerges in either text. In the Treatise, for example, he articulates
necessity in terms of the uniformity to be found in both realms. (I shall come back to the
notion of uniformity shortly.) Hence, “There is a general course o f nature in human
actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate . .. uniformity in the
actions .. . and this uniformity forms the very essence o f necessity.”187 Thus understood,
Hume is not simply making the weaker claim that “the natural and moral evidence . . .
form only one chain of argument betwixt them . . . [and] are of the same nature, . . .
deriv’d from the same principles,”188 but additionally the definitive claim that they are
essentially o f the same ‘kind’. This identification is made in more unequivocal terms in
the Inquiry.
If we examine the operations o f body and the production o f effects from
their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us further in

186 Hendel, Inquiry, 92.
187 Treatise, op. cit., 402-3.
188 Ibid., 406.
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our knowledge o f this relation than barely to observe that particular objects
are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary
transition, from the appearance o f the one to the belief o f the other. But though
this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result o f the strictest scrutiny
o f this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate
further into the powers o f nature and perceive something like a necessary
connection between the cause and the effect.. .But being once convinced that we
know nothing further o f causation o f any kind than merely the constant
conjunction o f objects and the consequent inference o f the mind from one to
another, and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have
place in voluntary actions, we may be more easily led to own the same necessity
common to all causes.189
.. .Here is a connected chain o f natural causes and voluntary actions, but the mind
feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another, nor is less
certain o f the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the
memory or senses by a train o f causes cemented together by what we are pleased
to call a “physical” necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on
the mind, whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions, or figure and
motion. We may change the names o f things, but their nature and their operation on
the understanding never change.190

Thus far, I have been arguing that Hume provides a regularity thesis of causation.
While I certainly agree that the textual evidence supports this construal, I have claimed
that Hume’s treatment o f necessity extends beyond a simple regularity account. I have
attempted to demonstrate this latter point by focusing on the psychological underpinning
of the inference o f the mind that constitutes one of the two features of the regularity
account. That is to say, our idea o f necessity originates in the subjectively-held belief (or
expectation) formed as a result of the repeated experience of the constant conjunction of
similar objects. Now while as a first approximation this belief may appear to be nothing
more than the by-product of empirical observation— after all, were it not for the
experience o f the conjunctions no inference would be possible— it is my claim that the
experiential derivation o f the expectation proves a minor detail. In order to appreciate
this, we need only to consider that in the absence of the psychological equipment—i.e.

189 Hendel, Inquiry, 101-2; emphases mine.
190 Ibid., 100; emphases mine.
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the content(s) o f the mind—our propensity to infer (like effects from like causes, and vice
versa) would not arise. Consequently, the issue is no longer how we come to infer
necessary connections between objects but more importantly why we do so. The answer
to this neglected question provides the key to understanding Hume’s solution to the free
will debate, a solution which is most easily discernible from his equating necessity with
predictability and the uniformity of human actions in the Treatise, and especially the
Inquiry. In fact, Hume’s contribution to the debate needs to be understood within the
context of this revised framework.
Having now defended the claim that Hume’s solution to the dispute consists in an
appreciation of the practical implications contained in the knowledge that “our actions
have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances, ”1911 will next
argue that Hume redefines necessity in part in terms of predictability (uniformity), and in
so doing effectively takes himself out of the boundaries of the traditional free will debate.
With this shown, I will move on to the final task of attempting to counter what I believe
to be the single salient objection against my claim, namely Hume’s seeming endorsement
of the compatibilist hypothetical sense of liberty.
Hume commentators are seemingly undisturbed by the logical inconsistency
inherent in acknowledging, on one hand, that Hume effectively redefines the issue while
construing him as a classical example of one of the positions represented within the
traditional dispute, on the other. Scholars on either side of the fence are certainly willing
to concede Hume’s reformulation o f the problem as argued for in either of the “O f liberty
and necessity” sections, for there is an abundance of textual evidence that simply cannot
be ignored. Here are some of the more obvious examples from the Treatise.
191 Treatise, op. cit., 401.
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As long as actions have a constant union and connexion with the situation
and temper o f the agent, however we may in words refuse to acknowledge
the necessity, we really allow the thing.192
’Tis impossible for the mind to penetrate farther. From this constant union
it forms the idea o f cause and effect, and by its influence feels the necessity. As
there is the same constancy, and the same influence in what we call moral evidence,
I ask no more. What remains can only be a dispute o f w ords.193 (406; italicized in
original; emphases mine)
I dare be positive no one will endeavour to refute these reasonings otherwise than
by altering my definitions, and assigning a different meaning to the terms o f cause,
and effect, and necessity, and liberty, and chance.194
I define necessity two ways, conformable to the two definitions o f cause, o f which
it makes an essential part. I place it either in the constant union and conjunction o f
like objects, or in the inference o f the mind from the one to the other. Now,
necessity in both these senses, has universally, tho’ tacitely, in the schools, in the
pulpit, and in common life, been allow’d to belong to the will o f man, and no one
has ever pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions,
and that those inferences are founded on the experience’d union o f like actions with
like motives and circumstances. The only particular in which any one can differ
from me, is either, that perhaps he will refuse to call this necessity... Or that he will
maintain there is something else in the operations o f matter.195

Three significant points emerge from the foregoing citations. First, it is clear that
Hume wants to apply the regularity thesis of ‘natural’ necessity developed in the previous
sections to the case o f ‘morals’— i.e. human actions and choices—under discussion here.
In so doing, the regularity theory is transformed from a basic description of the
components—i.e. constant conjunction and the associated inference of the mind—of
necessity to an account o f our need to conceive of the relations between objects as being
necessarily connected. It is here that the psychological basis of Hume’s treatment of
necessity is most apparent. Second, Hume is advocating an obviously anti-causal realist
line o f thought here. This is clear from the regularity-based construal of necessity
contained in each o f the above passages, and most notably from the last line of the last
192 Ibid., 403.
193 Ibid., 406; italicized in original; emphases mine.
194 Ibid., 407; emphases in original.
195 Ibid., 409; italicized in original; emphases mine.
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quotation above. Hume himself does not believe that there is “something else in the
operations o f matter.” Here I take him to be referring to causal necessitation196 as this
‘something else’. Finally, and most importantly, is the detail that for Hume the dispute
hinges entirely upon language, specifically upon the meanings of the terms or
expressions used in it. This is not to say that Hume conceives of the debate as hinging on
semantics. Instead, Hume’s declaration can be taken in one of two ways: either he means
that the inability (or unwillingness) of parties to the debate to agree on the meanings of
the relevant terms is the source of the confusion and hence of the disagreement, an
alternative which appears to be the one endorsed by traditional Hume commentary—it at
least certainly accounts for their seeming ignorance of the internally inconsistent nature
of their position; or, which seems to me to be a far more likely alternative, it is precisely
this in which Hume’s redefinition of the terms of the debate consists. In other words,
Hume is introducing his own terminology and in so doing redefines the terms of the
argument entirely; this reformulation can be observed in the above-cited passages from
the Treatise as well as the following analogous ones from the Inquiry.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt
or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions
o f men and in the operations o f mind, it must follow that all mankind have
ever agreed in the doctrine o f necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed
merely fo r not understanding each other.197
Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely, the question o f body
and brute unintelligent matter, and try whether they can there form any idea
o f causation and necessity, except that o f a constant conjunction o f objects
and subsequent inference o f the mind from one to another. If these
circumstances form, in reality, the whole o f that necessity which we conceive
in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take
place in the operations o f the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be
owned to be thenceforth merely verbal.198
196 Or, in other words, causal power.
197 Hendel, Inquiry, 92; emphases mine.
198 Ibid., 102; emphases mine.
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But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question o f liberty
and necessity.. .it will not require many words to prove that all mankind have
ever agreed in the doctrine o f liberty as well as that o f necessity, and that the
whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal.199
The only particular in which anyone can differ is that either perhaps he will
refuse to give the name o f necessity to this property o f human actions— but
as long as the meaning is understood I hope the word can do no harm— or that
he will maintain it possible to discover something further in the operations o f
matter.200

It is evident that Hume has reformulated the terms of the debate so as to define necessity
in terms other than causally deterministic ones. Recalling Strawson’s comparative
analysis o f the regularity account and a version of its determinist counterpart, what
distinguishes the one from the other is the notion of production or causal necessitation
that is present in the latter and absent from the former.
Looking next to Hume’s identification of necessity as consisting o f (1) the
constant conjunction and/or union of objects (including actions) and (2) the inference of
the mind from the one to the other, it is unmistakably obvious that no causally necessary
connection(s) is (are) here implied between the objects (actions). Necessity as above
delineated amounts to nothing beyond constant conjunction, union, and/or succession (in
addition to the associated inference). Put another way, in claiming that our motives,
tempers, etc., are constantly conjoined with our actions, decisions, choices, etc., Hume is
not—as against the causal determinist—contending that our motives give rise to,
produce, and/or causally necessitate our actions.
While Hume reformulates necessity in terms of predictability and uniformity in
each of the “O f necessity and liberty” sections, substantial analysis of ‘liberty’ occurs

199 Ibid., 104; emphases mine.
200 Ibid., 199. This quote is nearly identical in content to the last o f the above-cited passages from the
Treatise.
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really only in the Inquiry. In fact, in the Treatise, Hume’s treatment of the latter is
limited to a paragraph wherein the following two definitions are provided: (1) Liberty of
Spontaneity, or freedom that is “oppos’d to violence” and (2) Liberty of Indifference, or
freedom that is “a negation o f necessity and causes”.

Hume does not here deal directly

with the free will issue, being instead satisfied to imply only that the source of the debate
originates in our having confused these two notions of freedom. According to Hume, we
should retain only the first sense of liberty. In the Inquiry Hume actually explicates why
we should adopt this latter conception of freedom rather than the opposing alternate
sense. This analysis follows on the heels of his treatment of necessity, which in turn is an
elaborated version of the account appearing in the Treatise, to which I now turn.
Having established that ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ necessity involves nothing other
than constant conjunction and the associated inference of the mind, Hume proceeds to fill
in the details supporting this identification which, as evidenced by the following, is
articulated as uniformity:
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions
o f men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still die same in its
principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions; the
same events follow from the same causes.202
So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human
motives and actions...203

Notice Hume’s choice o f words in the first excerpt— ‘the same events follow from the
same causes’. This corroborates the anti-realist reading, for Hume is unwilling to argue
that the same events necessarily follow from, are causally necessitated by, and/or are
produced by, the same causes. Instead, Hume is willing to concede only the regularity
201 Treatise, op. cit., 408.
202 Hendel, Inquiry, 92-3.
203 Ibid., 94.
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thesis’ principle of succession, here conceived of in terms of the constant conjunction of
motives and actions. This is also clearly articulated in the following passage.
Our idea, therefore, o f necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity
observable in the operations o f nature, where similar objects are constantly
conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from
the appearance o f the other. These two circumstances form the whole o f
that necessity which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction o f
similar objects and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no
notion o f any necessity o f connection.204

Hume proceeds to identify the source of the dispute as originating in disagreement and/or
contusion of the meaning(s) o f the terms involved.
If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt
or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions
o f men and in the operations o f mind, it must follow that all mankind have
ever agreed in the doctrine o f necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed
merely for not understanding each other.205

Contrary to Hume’s claim, however, it is not the case that the controversy has
proven merely verbal but rather that Hume has redefined the problem so as to turn on
semantics. This reformulation constitutes, in fact, Hume’s solution to the debate. By
conceiving of the problem as a verbal dispute, Hume ultimately eliminates its very basis.
Put another way, the dilemma o f determinism constitutes a metaphysical problem and not
a verbal one as Hume alleges. But in defining the debate thus, Hume is effectively
repudiating the framework on which the controversy is founded, and hence, the debate in
its entirety. Hume’s reinterpretation of a metaphysical issue is easily understandable
given the fundamental opposition that exists between a metaphysical and empiricist
thesis, respectively. In other words, given Hume’s empiricist project, it is no surprise that
he would in fact reject the problem in its entirety by reformulating it altogether. And so

204 Ibid., 92; emphases Hendel’s.
205 Ibid.
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the question arises as to the reason for Hume’s treatment of necessity as it relates to the
moral realm. In other words, why does he think that we construe human actions in terms
of necessary connections?
The answer to this question is to be found in the practical considerations that
undergird his defining necessity in terms of uniformity and predictability. In other
words, he is interested in the utility of being able to predict human actions, choices (as
well as natural events) similar to the practical function of the study of history and the
experience gained from social interaction with others, namely in order to establish
general maxims or principles that enable us to get on in the world given our relatively
stable nature (over time):
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs
us o f nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover
the constant and universal principles o f human nature by showing men in all
varieties o f circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials
from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the
regular springs o f human action and behavior. These records o f wars, intrigues,
factions, and revolutions are so many collections o f experiments by which the
politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles o f his science, in the same
manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the
nature o f plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which
he forms concerning them 206
Hence, likewise, the benefit o f that experience acquired by long life and a variety
o f business and company, in order to instruct us in the principles o f human nature
and regulate our future conduct as well as speculation. By means o f this guide we
mount up to the knowledge o f men’s inclinations and motives from their actions,
expressions, and even gestures, and again descend to the interpretation o f their
actions from our knowledge o f their motives and inclinations. The general
observations, treasured up by a course o f experience, give us the clue o f human
nature and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no
longer deceive us.207

And most obviously:
But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which
we could form o f this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect
any general observations concerning mankind, and no experience, however

206 Hendel, Inquiry, 93; emphases mine.
207 Ibid., 94; emphases mine.
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accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose.208

These passages illuminate the practical-versus-theoretical (metaphysical) assumptions
operative in Hume’s analysis of the issue. In fact, Hume’s empiricist-based rejection of
metaphysical notions such as ‘substance’ and ‘se lf serves to undermine the basis of the
causal realist reading by denying the possibility of an entity (or entities)— some actual
thing (or things)— in which a necessary connection or connections can be said to inhere.
The above-cited excerpts, however, provide an additional rebuff, namely, a denial of the
skeptical consistency line o f defense operative in both the realist and agnostic construals.
Recalling Wright and Strawson’s conception o f Humean skepticism as being
compatible rather than incompatible with the possibility of the objective existence of
causal powers, the internal consistency of Hume’s skepticism is not a foregone
conclusion. Given Hume’s above-cited discussion of our (relatively) fixed human nature,
it is not at all clear that Hume is as consistent in his skepticism as either he himself or his
commentators would have liked. This is an extremely significant point that carries
implications for his general line of reasoning. For unlike his empiricism, Hume’s
skepticism cannot be reconciled with his science of human nature; while observations
derived from the assumption of a relatively fixed nature are perfectly in keeping with an
empiricist philosophy, the presupposition of such a nature is not at all compatible with a
thorough-going skepticism. In fact, Hume’s rejection o f ideas such as substance, self,
etc., appear to originate in his skepticism, but his above-cited line of reasoning runs
directly counter to such a supposition. There is, however, one possible solution as
contained in the following proviso:

1Ibid., 95.
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We must not, however, expect that this uniformity o f human actions should
be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will
always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for
the diversity o f characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity, in
every particular, is found in no part o f nature. On the contrary, from
observing the variety o f conduct in different men we are enabled to form a
greater variety o f maxims which still suppose a degree o f uniformity and
regularity.209

The popular sense o f ‘substance’ (or human nature) to which Hume is here referring is
not to be confused with its competing metaphysical notion. Human nature is fixed
insofar as, given similar geographical, cultural, biological, conditions, for instance,
behaviour can be for the most part predicted based on past observation(s). Variability is,
in effect, built into this definition of human nature as evidenced by Hume’s own
admission. And thus Hume is not here invoking any metaphysical—i.e. fixed,
predetermined, and/or permanent—conception of substance (or nature); instead, he is
simply making a practical claim about the utility o f our ability to predict future behaviour
based on our observations o f past behaviour.
Thus far I have argued that Hume has reformulated the dilemma of determinism
from a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the causal relation to psycho-pragmatic
considerations about the content(s) of the mind and the reasons undergirding our
experience o f the relations between events in terms of necessary connections. In other
words, he has recast a theoretical problem as a practical issue by rejecting the principle of
causal determinism. To this end, my claim is not—with perhaps the more recent
exception of the causal realist interpretation—particularly controversial. As I argued in
the first and second chapters, Old Hume commentary defends this line of reasoning.
Rather, it is my further claim that Hume’s discussion o f liberty—and hence his
contribution(s) to the free will debate—needs to be reconsidered in light of his
209 Ibid.
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redefinition o f necessity; this has so far been neglected, and it is to this final point that I
shall now turn.
While I have been arguing that the compatibilist attribution of Hume originates in
the mistaken assumption on the part of commentators that Hume’s liberty and necessity
arguments ought to be, and were intended by Hume to be, treated independently of each
other, I can appreciate the source of the mistake. It is in fact Hume’s identification of
liberty in the Inquiry as “he could have done otherwise (if he had so chosen)” which has
proven to be the root o f the confusion. That this definition appears in the same paragraph
as Hume’s proposed ‘reconciling project’ certainly does not help make things clear. This
being said, a remark immediately following the definition provides the necessary solution
for which I have been arguing. Let us first consider the passage.
But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question
o f liberty and necessity— the most contentious question o f metaphysics,
the most contentious science-—it will not require many words to prove
that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine o f liberty as well as in
that o f necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been
hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty when applied to
voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little
connection with motives, inclinations, and circumstances that one does not
follow with a certain degree o f uniformity from the other, and that one
affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence o f the other.
For these are plain and acknowledged matters o f fact. By liberty, then, we
can only mean a pow er o f acting or not acting according to the determinations
o f the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may, if we choose to move,
we also may. N ow this hypothetical liberty is allowed to belong to everyone who
is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject o f dispute.210

This passage reiterates Hume’s basic assumptions, namely (1) his redefinition of the
terms of the debate, (2) the perceived interdependence of his necessity and liberty
arguments, and (3) his regularity account of (moral) necessity in terms of uniformity. In
addition to this, however, he identifies himself as pursuing a ‘reconciling project’ and
restates the Liberty of Spontaneity identified in the Treatise as the freedom that is
210 Ibid., 104; emphases Hendel’s.
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‘oppos’d to coercion’ as the ‘hypothetical’ sense of liberty. I believe that these latter two
particulars account for the misconstrued compatibilist attribution. That Hume conceives
of his treatment of necessity and liberty as a ‘reconciling project’ appears at first sight to
support his adoption o f a compatibilist strategy. However, Hume characterizes his
project as one o f reconciliation only after he has already revealed that he has redefined a
key term—i.e. necessity—o f the debate.
That Hume was ignorant o f the essential features of this perennial philosophical
problem is implausible.211 That is to say, Hume surely appreciated that the problem of
freedom and moral responsibility turns on the truth or falsity of determinism. However,
instead of simply denying the determinist thesis and endorsing an alternate theory with a
view to remaining within the framework of the traditional argument, Hume’s aim was to
do away with the debate entirely. He did so by providing a regularity theory of
causation. But now the question arises as to what, in fact, Hume was then attempting to
reconcile, if not determinism with human freedom and (moral) responsibility. I think that
Hume’s use o f the term points to his being privy, but opposed, to the substance of the
traditional dispute. To be sure, Hume can be and intended to be construed as providing a
compatibilist solutionn—but not, however, to the original problem. Rather, he addresses
his reformulated version of the problem. Put another way, Hume can certainly be read as
a compatibilist in terms o f his own argument, but his sense of the term is not the
traditional one.

211 Now, in saying this I am not claiming that what sets Hume apart from compatiblists is his complete
disdain o f metaphysics. Dennett, for example, dismisses metaphysical issues (see footnote above). Quite
apart from this, however, my claim that Hume is not a compatibilist derives from his complete redefinition
o f the issue. To this end, the metaphysical point is really incidental to his position, although I do think that,
given the context in which Hume’s arguments are taking place, the endorsement o f metaphysics would
have been a clear indication o f a compatibilist position. (Perhaps then, the argument could also be made
that Dennett’s compatibilism is essentially Humean.)
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The main source o f the compatibilist misattribution can, I think, be traced to his
apparent endorsement o f a quintessentially compatibilist notion of freedom, namely that
the agent could have done otherwise (had s/he so chosen). Recalling my analysis in
chapter one, the point at issue between hard and soft determinists rests on their opposing
conceptions o f freedom, or the categorical versus the hypothetical senses of liberty
respectively. Admittedly, Hume’s explicit identification of “this hypothetical liberty”
would, in itself, appear to serve as proof for a compatibilist line of reasoning. However,
Hume himself provides us with a reason to think otherwise. Immediately subsequent to
his description in the Inquiry, he makes the following cautionary note:
Whatever definition we may give o f liberty, we should be careful to observe
two requisite circumstances: first, that it be consistent with plain
matter o f fact; secondly, that it be consistent with itself.. .21

This remark illuminates what I have been claiming constitutes the core of his position
with respect to the traditional free will issue as here articulated via his construal of
liberty: Hume’s interests are limited to practical or pragmatic rather than metaphysical or
theoretical considerations. His admonition that a proper definition of liberty ought to ‘be
consistent with plain matter o f fact’ supports the pragmatism that undergirds his
identification of moral necessity as predictability and uniformity. It is important to note
that Hume is not here referring to ‘Matters of Fact’ understood as one of the two
categories—the other being ‘Relations of Ideas’—that make up his Theory of Ideas (i.e.,
the objects o f reasoning). The inclusion of the term ‘plain’ certainly supports the basis
for this distinction.213 Rather, Hume’s claim here must be interpreted along the same
lines as his treatment o f necessity: that common-sense ought to guide our conception(s)
212 Ibid., 104; emphases Hendel’s.
213 Given the early modem philosophy’s picture theory with which Hume was operating, he could just as
well be referring here to ‘plain’ as self-evident or clearly obvious in any palpable or tangible sense.
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of human freedom and moral responsibility. This line of reasoning is supported by two
important interrelated features of Hume’s general philosophy.
ha the first place, Hume’s rejection of metaphysics214 derives at one level from its
impracticality, especially as it relates to the study of human nature and the content(s) of
the mind. Hume’s empiricism reveals interests that prove far too practical for
metaphysical abstractions. This is additionally supported by Hume’s ethical theory which
is ‘utilitarian’ in outlook, if not in content.215 Recalling Stroud’s analysis, Hume’s ethics
does not take vice and virtue to be actual qualities of objects—understood as actions—
but rather to be ‘additions’ by us.216 Thus understood, commentators’ ignorance of the
connection between Hume’s construal of liberty and his regularity-based account of
necessity has led them to read him as providing a compatibilist thesis by limiting their
analyses to his identification o f freedom as “he could have done otherwise”. They fail to

214 Indications o f Hume’s rejection are contained throughout his writings. One o f the most explicit
examples is, however, contained in the last paragraph o f ‘O f the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy’.
“When we run over libraries, persuaded o f these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our
hand any volume— o f divinity or school metaphysics, for instance— let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning
matter o f fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion.” (emphases in original)
215 Humean utilitarianism can be found in its most explicit form in the following passage from the Inquiry
o f Morals. “But what philosophical troths can more advantageous to society, than those here delivered,
which represent virtue in all her genuine and most engaging charms, and make us approach her with ease,
familiarity, and affection? The dismal dress falls off, with which many divines, and some philosophers
have covered her; and nothing appears but gentleness, humanity, beneficence, affability; nay even, at
proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaiety. She talks not o f useless austerities and rigorous suffering and selfdenial. She declares that her sole purpose is to make her votaries and all mankind, during every instant o f
their existence, i f possible, cheerful and happy; nor does she ever willingly part with any pleasure but in
hopes o f ample compensation in some other period o f their lives. The sole trouble, which she demands, is
that ofju st calculation, and a steady preference o f the greater happiness. And if any austere pretenders
approach her, enemies to joy and pleasure, she either rejects them as hypocrites and deceivers; or if she
admit them in her train, they are ranked however, among the least favoured o f her votaries.” David Hume,
An Inquiry Concerning the Principles o f Morals, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 79;
emphases mine.
216 See page 21 above.
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appreciate, however, that what Hume intends by this is something altogether different
than that intended by a compatibilist. Hume is simply making the very commonsensical
point that barring coercion, constraint, compulsion, and the like, we all possess freedom.
The description of Hume as ‘ulititarian’ needs qualification, since my usage
contains two features, only one of which is properly speaking utilitarian—i.e. insofar as
it is a consequentialist rather than a deontological ethical theory. What I mean by saying
that Hume’s ethical theory is ‘utiliarian’217 in outlook is just that morality is fixed in
experience insofar as we only come to learn through actual practice what qualifies as
virtuous and vicious actions. It is a matter of convention that what is in our best interest
coincides with that which is (considered to be) virtuous (rather than vicious). Thus
understood, Hume’s interest lies in the utility of experience, one that is captured in the
following declaration:
Custom, then, is the great guide o f human life. It is that principle alone which
renders our experience useful to us and makes us expect, for the future, a
similar train o f events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the
influence o f custom we should be entirely ignorant o f every matter o f fact
beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should
never know how to adjust means to ends or to employ our natural powers in
the production o f any effect.218

Clearly, utility assumes a fundamental role in Hume’s ethics, a detail that is not
surprising given his rejection of metaphysics. I shall return to this point in my
concluding remarks below.

2171 am, however, aware o f the controversy surrounding the issue o f whether or not Hume’s ethical theory
is utilitarian, properly understood. This is a topic that deserves greater examination than is here possible.
218 Hendel, Inquiry, 59; emphases mine.
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION

I have argued that both the standard regularity view and the more recent realist
reading misconstrue Hume’s position with respect to necessity, specifically because they
overlook the rationale o f his project. The reason for the compatibilist misattribution may
be conceived as having two aspects: first, it originates in the failure to appreciate that
Hume’s empiricism and skepticism necessarily inform his treatment of causality, in
which case the causal realist ascription is misguided; second, there is the matter of the
proper identification of the features of the compatibilist strategy itself, namely
acknowledgement of the truth of causal determinism. I shall deal with each o f these
details presently.
I have above analyzed the subject with respect to Hume’s empiricism; I shall next
examine the nature o f his skepticism in greater detail as it relates to the issue at hand. As
previously indicated, much o f the more recent ‘rival reading’ places great emphasis on
the consistency o f Humean skepticism as support for its realist interpretation. However,
this reading belies an ironic inconsistency: for if Hume is as skeptical as New Humeans
claim he is, then it seems rather odd that he would affirm the objective existence of
causal powers. And this points us to yet another possibility. That is to say, what if Hume
neither affirms nor denies, but is neutral on the question? Is Hume agnostic on the issue
of necessary connections? This possibility is certainly amenable to Hume’s rejection of
the radical—i.e. Pyhrronian—brand of skepticism, and while it certainly appears that
New Humeans are more open to an agnostic reading than their Old Hume counterparts,
who maintain that Hume conceives of necessity as nothing other than regularity—
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understood as the constant conjunction or regular succession of objects—are, what is of
significance here is that even if Hume is read along agnostic lines, the compatibilist
identification is mistaken. This result follows from the very fact that a compatibilist must
by definition believe in necessary connections. In other words, a genuine compatibilist
cannot be agnostic as to the objective existence of causal powers, and consequently
whether Hume is in fact unresolved about or positively denies these connections is
ultimately incidental to the issue.
Finally, we come to the question of why Hume has been construed as a
compatibilist. I have indicated several reasons above which will bear rehearsal: first, it is
because Hume commentators on either side of the debate have treated his liberty and
necessity arguments as independently-subsisting wholes rather than as parts of a whole;
second, Hume has seemingly contributed to the confusion by referring—specifically in
the Inquiry—to the hypothetical sense of liberty, a compatibilist cornerstone.
Admittedly, the argument could be made that the confusion is not due to Hume’s
shortsighted lack of clarity but instead to the fact that compatibilists have illegitimately
identified their sense of freedom with Hume’s original sense. The key to resolving the
confusion, however, lies in interpreting Hume’s discussion o f liberty and necessity by
remaining faithful to his intentions. Hume’s project is both psychological and practical in
nature. His ultimate interest is the empirical study of human nature. Hume values
rationality insofar as it enables individuals to get on in the world; to this end, his interests
are fundamentally pragmatic. I am claiming that we ought to interpret his treatment of
liberty in this light. The very fact that Hume identifies the free will debate as turning on
verbal disagreements points us in this direction. The issue, so far as he is concerned, is
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not about construing metaphysical abstractions that are about as useful to us as concepts
such as substance or self, but the very practically-based observation that, short of being
physically constrained or coerced, we are free.
This study suggests that Hume scholarship might gain considerable illumination
by considering his causal theory together with his ethical theory. Much o f Hume’s
discussion in ‘O f Liberty and Necessity’ spills over into the contents of the Inquiry o f
Morals and ought for this very reason to serve as a basis of interpretation for Hume’s
treatment of necessity, along with his empiricism and skepticism. More precisely,
Hume’s treatment o f necessary connections ought to be studied within the context of the
overarching empiricism and skepticism that so deeply informs his ethics.
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